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REGULATING TAX RETURN PREPARATION 
JAY A. SOLED* 
KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS** 
Abstract: Annually, the U.S. government collects nearly $3 trillion of income 
and employment taxes. With respect to these collections, Form 1040 (U.S. In-
dividual Income Tax Return) seeks to ensure taxpayer accuracy. Currently, 
two sets of players dominate the Form 1040 preparation and submission pro-
cess: tax return preparers and tax return preparation software companies. The 
former guides taxpayers through the entire tax return preparation and submis-
sion process, and the latter provides taxpayers with the necessary tools to 
complete and submit tax returns themselves. Tax return preparers and tax 
software companies thus stand as vital intermediaries between the government 
and taxpayers. Despite the key role that tax return submission plays in gov-
ernment function, Congress exercises virtually no oversight over the process. 
Currently, regardless of education, knowledge, or experience, any person can 
prepare tax returns for compensation; similarly, almost no checks exist to en-
sure the substantive accuracy of tax returns prepared with tax software. As a 
result of these shortcomings, taxpayers file millions of flawed tax returns each 
year. Faulty returns shortchange the government of necessary revenue, de-
prive some taxpayers of crucial government benefits, and leave others liable 
for back taxes and penalties. This Article is the first to propose comprehensive 
tax return preparation process reform. It urges Congress to regulate both tax 
return preparers and tax preparation software companies. Adoption of one or 
more of the proposed reforms should lead to more accurate tax returns, protect 
taxpayers, and ensure a fairer and more efficient tax system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under current law, tax return preparers and the tax return preparation 
software industry endure little regulatory oversight.1 Members of both groups 
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 1 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATED TO THE REGULATION OF CONDUCT OF PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS 4 
(Comm. Print 2014) (“While the Code provides standards of return preparation, disclosure rules, 
2017] Regulating Tax Return Preparation 153 
may essentially render their services or produce their products in any manner 
they please. If taxpayers were universally compliant, this laissez-faire ap-
proach on the part of Congress might be acceptable. Nevertheless, this is far 
from being the case. The nation’s tax gap (the difference between what tax-
payers owe and what they actually pay in tax)2 is significant—last estimated 
to be $458 billion annually3—and shows no immediate signs of abating. Insti-
tution of a set of reforms is in order because tax return preparers4 and the tax 
return preparation software industry5 play such vital roles in the tax admin-
istration process and, metaphorically speaking, are the nation’s fiscal gate-
keepers. 
Consider the fact that tax return preparers and the tax return prepara-
tion software industry share the same objectives. They want to produce tax 
returns that simultaneously minimize taxpayers’ tax burdens and do not at-
tract Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) audit attention. The reason for 
achieving these shared objectives is simple: if this outcome is successfully 
delivered, it will generate repeat business, yielding more professional fees 
                                                                                                                           
and civil penalties, neither the Code nor the related Treasury regulations require paid tax return 
preparers to meet any qualifications or competency standards before preparing tax returns or 
claims for refund.”). 
 2 See Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax Compliance, 20 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2009) (defining the “tax gap” as the difference between what tax-
payers owe on their tax returns and the amount they voluntarily pay in a timely manner). There is 
a plethora of literature on the tax gap and its size. See JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42739, TAX GAP, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CON-
GRESS 2 (2012); JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33882, TAX GAP AND TAX 
ENFORCEMENT 2 (2007); IRS & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A 
REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 1 (2007); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 2 (2006); 
Heather Bennett, IRS Must Get Grip on Tax Gap, Taxpayer Advocate Says, 106 TAX NOTES 531, 
531 (2005); Dustin Stumper, Everson Pledges to Narrow Growing Tax Gap, 110 TAX NOTES 807, 
807 (2006); George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449, 1449 
(2005). 
 3 The Tax Gap: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010, IRS (Apr. 28, 2016), https://
www.irs.gov/uac/the-tax-gap [https://perma.cc/RB2C-8TM8]. 
 4 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PRE-
PARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 8 (2014) (“According to 
IRS’s SOI data, an estimated 81.2 million or 56 percent of approximately 145 million individual 
tax returns filed for tax year 2011 were completed by a paid preparer.”). “The IRS estimates that 
there are between 900,000 and 1.2 million paid tax return preparers currently.” IRS, RETURN PRE-
PARER REVIEW 8 (2009). 
 5 See, e.g., IRS, supra note 4, at 9 (“Taxpayers self-prepared and electronically filed 32 mil-
lion tax returns using consumer tax preparation software during the 2009 filing season.”); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-297, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MANY TAXPAYERS 
RELY ON TAX SOFTWARE AND IRS NEEDS TO ASSESS ASSOCIATED RISKS 1 (2009) (“In 2007, 
over 39 million income tax returns were prepared by individuals using commercial tax software 
such as TurboTax, TaxCut, or TaxAct, and more than 66 percent of those returns were then filed 
electronically. This volume makes commercial tax return preparation software a critical part of the 
tax administration system.”). 
154 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:151 
and corporate profits. Nevertheless, these objectives are not necessarily 
those of the government. Instead, the government wants citizens to pay the 
taxes that they owe and to take only those reporting positions that are sup-
ported by substantial legal authority.6 
Additionally, consider the distribution of government benefits provided 
through the tax system, such as the earned income tax credit (“EITC”)7 or 
the child tax credit.8 The fact that these benefits are frequently delivered in 
the form of a tax refund9 provides an opportunity for return preparers to 
collect fees from taxpayers who would otherwise be unable to afford them. 
The common arrangement of deducting preparation fees from refunds, cou-
pled with the lack of regulation in this area, has led to an explosive industry 
of paid preparers who lack expertise in tax law and target low-income tax-
payers.10 These unregulated preparers often charge exorbitant and hidden 
fees11 while frequently making tax return errors,12 which, if detected by the 
IRS, leave the taxpayer responsible for repayment of taxes and interest. Thus, 
the government’s goal of maximizing benefits intended to reduce poverty and 
redistribute wealth13 stands squarely at odds with the private sector’s profit 
motive. 
In considering the apparent tension between the objectives of those 
who assist in the tax return preparation process and those of the govern-
ment, the latter’s objectives should prevail. The reason is simple: accurate 
tax return preparation is a fundamental need of every government, and the 
United States is no exception. In order to help taxpayers navigate their civic 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (d)(2)(B) (2012) (establishing that to avoid the imposition of an accu-
racy-related penalty, the reporting position must be grounded in “substantial authority”; or, alter-
natively, the taxpayer must make adequate disclosure). 
 7 Id. § 32. 
 8 Id. § 24. 
 9 See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD & REBECCA THIESS, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND 
THE CHILD TAX CREDIT: HISTORY, PURPOSE, GOALS, AND EFFECTIVENESS 2 (ECON. POL’Y 
INST., Issue Brief #370, Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-
income-tax-credit-and-the-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/ (“The EITC 
and CTC differ from most other tax credits in that they are partially or fully refundable.”). 
 10 See, e.g., CHI CHI WU & CHANTAL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MINE-
FIELD OF RISKS: TAXPAYERS FACE PERILS FROM UNREGULATED PREPARERS, LACK OF FEE DIS-
CLOSURE, AND TAX-TIME FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, at i (2016) (“Paid preparers offer and promote 
financial products that can be unnecessary and expensive, such as refund anticipation checks 
(RACs).”). 
 11 See id. at 8–9 (discussing “add-on” fees). 
 12 See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RIDDLED RETURNS: HOW ERRORS AND 
FRAUD BY PAID TAX PREPARERS PUT CONSUMERS AT RISK AND WHAT STATES CAN DO 1 (2014) 
(discussing erroneous tax returns prepared by unregulated preparers). 
 13 See HUNGERFORD & THIESS, supra note 9, at 2 (“Both the EITC and the CTC significantly 
reduce taxes on low- and middle-income families with children.”). 
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obligations and to facilitate compliance, it is essential that Congress regu-
late the tax return preparation process. 
This Article details the need for a comprehensive approach to regulat-
ing tax return preparers and the tax return preparation software industry and 
discusses why, in the absence of doing so, the integrity of the tax system is 
threatened.14 Part I explores how, to date, Congress has done little to regu-
late either industry.15 Part II discusses the implications of Congress’s nonin-
terventionist approach and makes an affirmative case for regulation of both 
tax return preparers and tax preparation software.16 Part III details the spe-
cific reforms that Congress should institute to enhance taxpayer compliance 
and strengthen accuracy in the delivery of government benefits.17  
I. CONGRESS’S HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO TAX RETURN PREPARATION 
Since the inception of the income tax in 1913,18 the tax return prepara-
tion process has become an integral part of the United States’ fiscal fabric.19 
At first, this “fabric” covered only a small sliver of the nation’s upper eco-
nomic echelon. In the aftermath of World War II with its fiscal demands, 
however, Congress transformed the income tax into a mass tax that required 
large-scale participation.20 Tax return submissions thus became a cultural 
phenomenon, regularly featured in the popular press, television shows, and 
even in musical lyrics.21 And although Congress placed a premium on 
standardization (for example, the time period that constitutes a tax year,22 
the due date by which taxpayers must submit their returns,23 and the forms 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 18–255 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–97 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 98–174 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 175–255 and accompanying text. 
 18 Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913) (current version at I.R.C. 
§ 1(a)–(e) (2012)). 
 19 See generally LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR 
THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 121–22 (2013) (discussing the universality of the tax 
return filing experience). 
 20 See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of 
the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 685–86 (1988–1989) (pointing out 
that, prior to World War II, only a small sliver of the nation’s population was subject to the in-
come tax and that, in the war’s aftermath, there was a dramatic increase of people subject to the 
income tax). 
 21 See ZELENAK, supra note 19, at ch. 6. 
 22 See Tariff Act, 38 Stat. at 168 (“The said tax shall be computed upon the remainder of said 
net income of each person subject thereto, accruing during each preceding calendar year ending 
December thirty-first.”). 
 23 See id. (“On or before the first day of March, nineteen hundred and fourteen, and the first 
day of March in each year thereafter, a true and accurate return, under oath or affirmation, shall be 
made by each person of lawful age.”). 
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that taxpayers must employ24), it did not put itself or the IRS at the helm of 
the tax return preparation process. Instead, taxpayers were charged with this 
responsibility. In response, taxpayers often turned to others and, more re-
cently, to technology for assistance. 
As the application of the income tax broadly expanded, a cottage in-
dustry quickly arose in the form of paid tax return preparers. For a fee, tax 
return preparers could alleviate much of the stress and anguish that taxpay-
ers commonly endured in preparing their own tax returns. Many taxpayers 
apparently found this option attractive, and they routinely have availed 
themselves of this service.25 
Decades later, the ubiquity of the Information Era26 and personal com-
puters triggered the launch of the tax return preparation software industry. 
This industry tried to make the tax return preparation process accessible to 
all; it largely accomplished this feat by breaking down the tax return’s com-
plexity into digestible tidbits and delegating all challenging (and simple) 
math computations to computer programs.27 The tax preparation software 
industry’s efforts were well rewarded as sales of the industry’s products cat-
apulted skyward.28 
The vast majority of taxpayers (around ninety percent) now rely upon 
either tax return preparers or tax preparation software for assistance with 
their tax returns.29 Indeed, for at least a quarter of the year (spanning from 
January to April 15) throughout the country, it’s hard to drive down a city 
block, listen to the radio, conduct an Internet search, or watch TV without 
seeing or hearing advertisements for tax return preparation assistance. 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See id. (“[Requiring the submission of a] form as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe, setting forth specifically the 
gross amount of income from all separate sources and from the total thereof, deducting the aggre-
gate items or expenses and allowance herein authorized . . . .” (alteration in original)). 
 25 See IRS, supra note 4, at 9 (“With tax return preparers preparing almost 60 percent of all 
returns filed, their impact on tax administration is significant.”). 
 26 For a concise description of the so-called Information Age, see generally NICHOLAS NE-
GROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995) (discussing the defining characteristics of the Information 
Age). 
 27 Jay A. Soled, Computers, Complexity, and the Code: Dawn of a New Era, 73 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 471, 472 (Oct. 28, 1996). 
 28 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 1 (concluding that the 
volume of tax returns submitted with the assistance of tax return preparation software makes that 
software an essential constituent of the tax return preparation apparatus). 
 29 See Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing, Protecting Taxpay-
ers] (written testimony of John A. Koskinen, Comm’r, IRS) (“Each year, paid preparers are called 
upon by taxpayers to complete about 80 million returns, or about 56 percent of the total individual 
income tax returns filed, while another 34 percent of taxpayers use tax preparation software, for a 
total of 90 percent who seek some form of assistance.”). 
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Today, the tax return preparation process is pivotal to the government, 
collecting close to $3 trillion annually in income and employment taxes.30 
Yet notwithstanding the vital importance of this process, Congress has, as 
the next two sections detail, essentially abdicated its oversight responsibili-
ties, failing to regulate (A) tax return preparers and (B) the tax return prepa-
ration software industry. 
A. Congressional Failure to Regulate Tax Return Preparers 
Congress did enact legislation in the late nineteenth century allowing 
for regulation of “agents, attorneys, or other persons representing persons” 
before the Department of Treasury.”31 Under this statutory authorization, 
the Treasury Department promulgated regulations in the early part of the 
twentieth century intended to govern the conduct of certain tax practitioners 
like attorneys and certified public accountants (“CPAs”).32 Nevertheless, it 
was not until 2011 that the Treasury Department attempted to regulate all 
tax return preparers by requiring licensing and competency testing.33 Never-
theless, as discussed further below, those regulations were short-lived: two 
courts found them to be outside of the scope of the enabling statute.34 Thus, 
at present, tax return preparers who are not attorneys, CPAs, or “enrolled 
agents”35 are generally free from any federal oversight.36 
1. Enabling Legislation 
Whether Congress originally intended to give the Treasury Department 
authority to regulate tax return preparers is a subject of dispute.37 
                                                                                                                           
 30 IRS, IRS DATA BOOK 2015, at 3 tbl.1 (2015). 
 31 See Horse Act of 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258 (1884) (current version at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330(a) (2012)). 
 32 See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32, 
285, 32,286 (June 3, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 35 Enrolled agents are individuals who are authorized to represent taxpayers before the IRS on 
matters like audits or appeals. To earn this credential, one must pass a competency examination, 
adhere to ethical standards, and undergo continuing education. Enrolled Agent Information, IRS 
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/enrolled-agents/enrolled-agent-information 
[https://perma.cc/5ZGH-8CVD]. 
 36 By electing to take a competency examination, tax return preparers may also gain limited 
rights to represent taxpayers before the IRS. See Understanding Tax Return Preparer Credentials 
and Qualifications, IRS (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/understanding-tax-
return-preparer-credentials-and-qualifications [https://perma.cc/8KFJ-QBAD] (discussing the volun-
tary Annual Filing Season Program). There is, however, no competency requirement to prepare tax 
returns for compensation. See id. 
 37 Compare Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 
139 TAX NOTES 767, 777 (May 13, 2013) (“The abuses Congress sought to regulate in 1884 are of 
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By way of background, in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, 
the problem of horse wrangling and other monetary claims forced Congress 
to address the issue of who could represent taxpayers before the Treasury 
Department. More specifically, Congress was concerned that people who 
appeared before the Treasury Department might act unscrupulously when 
making claims on the behalf of others; in particular, citizens might fabricate 
claims that their horses and other property had been commandeered for Civ-
il War use and, in conjunction with their advisers, seek undeserved compen-
sation.38 To address this concern, Congress passed legislation that enabled 
the Treasury Department to regulate “agents, attorneys, or other persons 
representing claimants before [the] Department.”39 
Over the ensuing years, Congress made a few cosmetic changes to this 
enabling legislation, but its substance has remained largely intact. The ena-
bling statute presently reads as follows: 
(a) [T]he Secretary of the Treasury may— 
 (1) regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the 
Department of the Treasury; and 
 (2) before admitting a representative to practice, require that 
the representative demonstrate— 
  (A) good character; 
  (B) good reputation; 
  (C) necessary qualifications to enable the representative to 
provide to persons valuable service; and 
  (D) competency to advise and assist persons in presenting 
their cases.40 
2. Regulations Promulgated Under the Enabling Legislation 
As discussed in this section, the Treasury Department narrowly con-
strued the application of this enabling legislation initially.41 Over time, 
however, the agency gradually extended the breadth of its regulations,42 
                                                                                                                           
the same type we see today regarding claims made on tax returns.”), with Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 
1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The original language plainly would not encompass tax-return 
preparers.”). 
 38 See Alex H. Levy, Believing in Life After Loving: IRS Regulation of Tax Preparers, 17 
FLA. TAX REV. 437, 440 (2015) (“Section 330 can be traced to a little-known law called the Horse 
Act of 1884. That act, which predates the modern federal income tax by nearly 30 years, allowed 
the Treasury Department to crack down on agents who fraudulently claimed reimbursement for 
veterans whose horses were lost or killed in the Civil War.”). 
 39 Horse Act of 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2012)) (alter-
ation in original). 
 40 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012). 
 41 See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
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most recently to cover tax return preparation.43 Critics argued, though, that 
such a broad extension was beyond Congress’s statutory authorization, and 
the judiciary agreed, subsequently voiding the expanded scope of these reg-
ulations.44 Since that time, Congress has remained virtually silent on the 
issue, and the enabling legislation has not been expanded. 
a. The Evolution of the Circular 230 Regulations 
In 1921, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations (known as 
“Circular 230”) under the enabling legislation that sought to regulate only 
those tax practitioners, namely, attorneys, and accountants who practiced 
before the agency.45 Not only did Circular 230 apply to a small segment of 
the population, it seemingly only applied to those who had physical interac-
tions (for example, meetings or adjudications) with government representa-
tives. 
In 1966, the Treasury Department broadened the ambit of Circular 230 
and its application. Going forward, attorneys and accountants would be 
granted automatic permission to act as taxpayer representatives if they sub-
mitted a completed Form 2848 (Power of Attorney and Declaration of Rep-
resentation) on their clients’ behalf.46 Noteworthy, too, was that the 1966 
version of Circular 230 expanded, for the first time, the purview of those 
who could represent taxpayers to include tax return preparers. Thereafter, 
tax return preparers were allowed to represent taxpayers whose returns they 
had prepared “before revenue agents and examining officers of the Audit 
Division in the offices of District Directors.”47 The 1966 amendment thus 
subjected tax return preparers (who were not otherwise attorneys or CPAs) 
to Circular 230’s disciplinary rules, but only when they represented taxpay-
ers before the IRS; the act of tax return preparation itself was not covered.48 
Two decades later, in 1984, the Treasury Department once again re-
crafted Circular 230. In another first, the agency sought to regulate those tax 
advisers who did not necessarily “practice” before it. The catalyst behind 
this change was the burgeoning growth of the tax shelter industry. In re-
sponse, the Treasury Department promulgated § 10.33 of Circular 230, enti-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 62–73 and accompanying text. 
 45 See Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 72 TAX NOTES 457, 458 n.6 
(July 29, 2013) (“The three basic regulatory efforts before 1921 were: Circular 13 (Feb. 6, 1886) 
(concerning internal taxes), Circular 94 (Oct. 4, 1890) (same), and T.D. 32974 (Nov. 30, 1912) 
(concerning Customs).”). 
 46 See Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,773, 10,774 (Aug. 13, 
1966) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
 47 Id. at 10,775. 
 48 See Camp, supra note 45, at 459. 
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tled Tax Shelter Opinions. This section set forth standards for written tax 
opinions that opined about the legitimacy of aggressive tax return posi-
tions.49 Going forward, tax professionals who provided clients with written 
advice about tax shelters were subject to Circular 230’s rules regardless of 
whether they had any direct dealings with the IRS. 
One decade later, in 1994, the agency made another monumental 
change to Circular 230, adding § 10.34. This section went well beyond reg-
ulating written opinions issued by the tax shelter industry. With a broad 
brushstroke applicable to all tax return preparation work, it required that a 
tax reporting position must always “have a realistic possibility of being sus-
tained on its merits” or, alternatively, be adequately disclosed to the IRS.50 
Thus, although Circular 230 did not dictate who could become a tax return 
preparer, the amendment covered the substance of what was reported on a 
return by a preparer. 
In 2004, the Treasury Department went a step further, adding § 10.35, 
§ 10.36, and § 10.37 to Circular 230; these sections specified more elabo-
rate standards of conduct that pertained to written tax advice, geared again 
toward the nonrepresentational behavior of practitioners rather than work 
before the agency.51 
Despite the repeated expansion of Circular 230’s ambit to include facets 
of tax return preparation, these amendments apparently did not go far enough 
to curb derelict behavior on the part of tax return preparers. Whether due to 
ignorance or malfeasance, the advice that many tax return preparers rendered 
continued to fall far short of the accuracy mark.52 A report prepared by the 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration,53 as well as two reports 
conducted by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”),54 supported 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, and En-
rolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719, 6719 (Feb. 23, 1984) (to 
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10); see Dennis J. Ventry Jr., No Joke: Circular 230 Is Here to Stay, 
111 TAX NOTES 1409, 1410 (2006) (“Treasury also articulated a specific antishelter strategy.”); 
Dennis J. Ventry Jr., The Reaction to the 1980 Proposed Amendments to Circular 230, 111 TAX 
NOTES 1141, 1141 (2006) (“The amendments were designed to shut down the mass marketing of 
tax shelters to nonclient investors.”). 
 50 Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled 
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 31,523 
(June 20, 1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). The new regulations also required that dis-
closed return positions not be frivolous. Id. 
 51 T.D. 9165, 2005-1 C.B. 359–63. 
 52 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A 
LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNCONTROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 3 (2008) 
(“Pursuing abusive preparers is part of the IRS’ strategy to reduce the tax gap, which researchers 
estimate to be $290 billion based on 2001 data.”). 
 53 See id. 
 54 For the two studies, see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-467T, 
PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS 
2017] Regulating Tax Return Preparation 161 
this indictment. Those reports also revealed that unsuspecting low-income 
taxpayers often were the targets of unregulated tax return preparers.55 Be-
cause Circular 230 at that time did not require any specific qualifications to 
become a tax return preparer, there were no checks in place to ensure that 
only qualified, scrupulous individuals could prepare tax returns. 
b. The 2011 Return Preparer Regulations 
In 2009, the Treasury Department conducted a study that confirmed 
that ameliorative action should be undertaken to address return preparer 
competency.56 In response to this study and on the basis of the enabling 
statute, the Treasury Department in 2011 promulgated new rules under Cir-
cular 230 aimed at regulating all tax return preparers,57 declaring that unli-
censed preparers would have to meet the following threefold conjunctive 
criteria: (a) pass a competency test related to Form 1040 and related sched-
ules; (b) pass a “suitability” background check; and (c) obtain a preparer tax 
identification number.58 
In addition to fulfilling these three criteria, practitioners, once regis-
tered, would have to complete fifteen hours of continuing education each 
year.59 Tax return preparers who were already licensed, such as attorneys, 
CPAs, and enrolled agents, were exempt from competency testing and con-
tinuing education requirements.60 The driving force behind these regula-
tions was straightforward: the Treasury Department sought to improve tax 
return preparers’ competency and strengthen their ethical moorings. By at-
tempting to get tax return preparers in line, the Treasury Department hoped 
to achieve better tax return accuracy and thereby narrow the tax gap.61 
                                                                                                                           
(2014); and U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPAR-
ERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS (2006). 
 55 See generally Olson, supra note 37 (expressing concern that the unprincipled actions of tax 
return preparers are exposing low-income communities to liability). 
 56 See IRS Launches Tax Return Preparer Review; Recommendations to Improve Compliance 
Expected by Year End, IRS (June 4, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Launches-Tax-Return-
Preparer-Review-Recommendations-to-Improve-Compliance-Expected-by-Year-End [https://perma.
cc/CX77-SQTN]. 
 57 Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,685, 
32,286 (June 12, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R pt. 10). 
 58 Id. at 32,287. 
 59 Id. at 32,290. 
 60 Id. at 32,287. Testing and continuing education were also not required for return preparers 
employed by law firms or by certified public accounting firms. Id. at 32,298. 
 61 See generally Russell J. George, TIGTA Discusses Enforcement Challenges Faced by the 
IRS, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 10, 2010, LEXIS, 2010 TNT 154-30 (acknowledging the need for 
the IRS to engage the tax return preparer community in an effort to reduce the tax gap). 
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c. Loving and Ridgely: The Demise of the Return Preparer Regulations 
Not all tax return preparers welcomed the Treasury Department’s ex-
pansive reading of the enabling statute and the new regulatory regime. Two 
lawsuits, Loving v. IRS62 and Ridgely v. Lew,63 reflect the deep-seated ani-
mosity that some tax return preparers harbored toward the newly promul-
gated regulations; in both cases, the courts upheld the tax return preparers’ 
challenges. Consider the facts and outcomes in each case. 
In Loving, a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
in 2014, three tax return preparers sought to strike down the new licensing 
and testing regime as being beyond the scope of the enabling statute,64 which, 
recall, allows for regulation of “practice of representatives of persons before 
the Department of the Treasury.”65 In affirming the district court, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that tax return preparation involves as-
sisting taxpayers, not representing them, and assisting and representing are 
not interchangeable terms.66 Furthermore, the court found that preparing a tax 
return cannot be equated to “practice . . . before the Department of the Treas-
ury,” which it stated would probably “involve traditional adversarial proceed-
ings.”67 On the basis of these and other findings,68 the appeals court struck 
down the newly crafted regulations as being invalid. 
In Ridgely, a case before the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia in 2014, a CPA also sought to invalidate the expansion of Circular 
230 to cover tax return preparers.69 The plaintiff in that case did not chal-
lenge the new registration and testing regime as the plaintiffs had in Loving 
but, rather, challenged the fact that tax return preparation was now under the 
ambit of Circular 230 more broadly.70 Specifically, Mr. Ridgely contended 
that Circular 230’s prohibition on contingent fee arrangements for refund 
claims should not apply to him because, in merely preparing amended tax 
returns to claim the refunds, he was not actually “representing” the taxpay-
er.71 Just as it had in Loving, the IRS once again found itself on the losing 
side of a court battle. The same district court that had ruled in Loving ap-
                                                                                                                           
 62 Loving, 742 F.3d at 1015. 
 63 Ridgely v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89, 90 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 64 Loving, 742 F.3d at 1015. 
 65 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1). 
 66 Loving, 742 F.3d at 1017 (“The tax-return preparer certainly assists the taxpayer, but the 
tax-return preparer does not represent the taxpayer.”). 
 67 Id. at 1018, 1019. 
 68 See id. at 1019–21. The appeals court cites three other rationales for its holding in the tax-
payer’s favor: the history of the enabling statute, the broader statutory framework, and the fact that 
such a major delegation of power was not explicitly provided for by Congress. Id. 
 69 Ridgely, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 93. 
 70 Id. at 91. 
 71 See id. 
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plied the identical rationale in Ridgely: the plaintiff CPA was merely “assist-
ing” the taxpayer and was in no way representing him;72 as such, this fore-
closed Circular 230’s application to the CPA’s fee arrangement. In the words 
of the court, those activities leading up to a tax return submission were not 
within the enabling statute’s ambit; instead, only if the IRS commenced an 
audit would “practice” before the agency begin, triggering the statute’s ap-
plication and, by extension, Circular 230 oversight.73 
d. Current Environment: Lack of Oversight 
In the aftermath of the Loving and Ridgely decisions, the Treasury De-
partment has essentially lost its latitude to regulate tax return preparers. Put 
slightly differently, when it comes to congressional oversight of tax return 
preparers, there is none.74 That being the case, anyone can claim to be a tax 
return preparer, set up shop, hang out a shingle, and start preparing tax re-
turns. Historically, such broad latitude does not bode well for tax compli-
ance.75 The Treasury Department could thus redesign Form 1040 in a man-
ner that would potentially help ensure better tax compliance; such efforts, 
however, would be almost entirely for naught if the financial gatekeepers of 
the income tax system—namely, tax return preparers—are ill-trained, un-
scrupulous, or simply ignorant. 
B. Congressional Failure to Regulate the Tax Return  
Preparation Software Industry 
In contrast to the saga over regulating paid tax return preparers, the 
history behind tax return preparation software is rather brief. Essentially, it 
is a story of free rein bestowed by both Congress and the Treasury Depart-
ment on the tax return software industry from its inception. 
Over the last several decades, the tax return preparation software in-
dustry has grown by leaps and bounds.76 Despite this stupendous growth, 
Congress has exercised virtually no oversight over this multibillion-dollar 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. at 95 (“CPAs . . . [without] any power of attorney possess[] no ‘legal authority to act on 
behalf of taxpayers.’ In Loving’s words, these individuals merely ‘assist[]’ the taxpayer. Thus, 
Section 330’s use of the term ‘representative’ excludes refund claim preparers, just as it did tax-
return preparers in Loving.” (alteration in original) (quoting Loving, 742 F.3d at 1017)). 
 73 Id. at 96. 
 74 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 1, at 4. 
 75 See IRS Launches Tax Return Preparer Review, supra note 56 (announcing a review of tax 
preparers spurred by a study suggesting that the tax return preparer industry required ameliorative 
action). 
 76 See, e.g., Beryl A. Howell, Court Enjoins Proposed Merger Between H&R Block and 
TaxACT on Antitrust Grounds, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 14, 2011, LEXIS, 2011 TNT 219-10 
(“Digital Do It-Yourself preparation is becoming increasingly popular.”). 
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industry.77 To date, there are three areas of legislation that minimally shape 
the tax return preparation software industry. First, the Internal Revenue 
Code (“Code”) requires that the tax return preparation software industry 
design its software in a manner that permits e-filing.78 Second, tax return 
software companies (along with tax return preparers) are forbidden from 
disclosing or using taxpayers’ personal information without authorization.79 
Finally, software companies are subject to privacy and safeguarding rules 
administered by the Federal Trade Commission.80 
Similarly, neither the Treasury Department nor the IRS has unilaterally 
sought to exercise much oversight over the tax return preparation software 
industry. Currently, the IRS requires software developers to annually verify 
that their products are electronically compatible with the IRS’s processing 
systems, that tax rates are updated, and that the software’s computations are 
correct.81 Apart from these minor verification requirements, tax return soft-
ware companies are generally granted carte blanche. In fact, the IRS gener-
ally does not conduct any testing to determine whether the substantive 
guidance provided by tax return preparation software companies is accurate 
and whether the software prepares correct returns.82 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See IRS, supra note 4, at 9–10 (“Despite large volumes of returns prepared using consumer 
and commercial tax preparation software, quality control over these products rests exclusively 
with the software publishers.”). 
 78 See I.R.C. § 6011(e)(1) (2012) (providing the statutory basis for regulations governing e-
filing). Annually, the IRS publishes specifications that provide software companies with appropri-
ate guidelines. See generally IRS, HANDBOOK FOR AUTHORIZED IRS E-FILE PROVIDERS OF INDI-
VIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (2014) [hereinafter IRS, AUTHORIZED E-FILE PROVIDERS] (guid-
ing tax return preparers who e-file individual income tax returns); IRS, MODERNIZED E-FILE 
(MEF) GUIDE FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS AND TRANSMITTERS (2016) [hereinafter IRS, SOFT-
WARE DEVELOPERS & TRANSMITTERS] (establishing technical specifications for tax preparation 
software developers and for those who transmit tax returns electronically). 
 79 See I.R.C. § 6713 (civil penalty for disclosure or use of taxpayer information by return 
preparer); id. § 7216 (criminal penalty for same); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.7216-1(b)(2)(i)(B) 
(2016) (including, for purpose of privacy rules, software developers in the definition of tax return 
preparers). 
 80 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 8 (discussing application of 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to tax software companies). 
 81 See id. at 10 (“IRS requires tax software to pass its Participants Acceptance Testing System 
(PATS), which includes verifying that computations are correct, tax rate schedules are updated, 
and returns transmitted electronically are compatible with IRS systems.”); see also Rev. Proc. 
2007-40, 2007 IRB LEXIS 567 (“This revenue procedure informs Authorized IRS e-file Providers 
of their obligations to the Internal Revenue Service (the Service), taxpayers, and other participants 
in the e-file Program . . . .”); IRS, AUTHORIZED E-FILE PROVIDERS, supra note 78, at 10 (specify-
ing steps that software developers must take to ensure that the IRS is able to process taxpayer 
submissions); IRS, SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS & TRANSMITTERS, supra note 78, at 11 (providing 
technical directions for software developers). 
 82 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 10 (“However, PATS does not 
go further in testing to determine, for example, whether the guidance tax software provides is 
sufficient in helping taxpayers prepare accurate tax returns.”); see also DEP’T OF TREASURY, NO. 
2005-40-025, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE TAX SOFTWARE PACKAGES 2 (2005) (“The 
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Perhaps in an endeavor to avoid more substantial oversight, the tax re-
turn preparation software industry has imposed a modicum of self-regulation 
and has, in some circumstances, cooperated with the government. Consider 
two such instances. 
First, bowing to congressional and public pressure, in 2002 the tax re-
turn software industry joined the IRS to form the “Free File Alliance.”83 
This program enables low- and moderate-income taxpayers to prepare their 
tax returns for free via the IRS website, using software programs provided 
by members of the alliance, which is made up of over a dozen tax return 
preparation software companies.84 In exchange for the software companies 
agreeing to provide free filing services to at least seventy percent of taxpay-
ers (those with adjusted gross incomes of $60,000 or less for 2015), the IRS 
has agreed not to develop its own tax return preparation software to com-
pete with the private industry.85 Over the past decade, participation in the 
program has been quite low. In 2014, for example, approximately 2.8 mil-
lion taxpayers took advantage of the program, which represented less than 
three percent of eligible taxpayers.86 Only forty-six million people have 
used the program since its inception in 2003, which is anemic compared to 
the roughly one hundred million taxpayers who qualify each year to partic-
ipate.87 Some critics have pointed out that the available filing categories on 
the Free File Alliance website exclude many taxpayers in the under $60,000 
income range, such as seniors or taxpayers with certain types of deduc-
                                                                                                                           
testing is intended to ensure e-filed tax returns can be initially processed much like tax returns 
submitted on paper. Nevertheless, the tests are not created to check for misapplication of the tax 
law.”). 
 83 See Free Online Electronic Tax Filing Agreement Signed, IRS (June 16, 2016), https://www.
irs.gov/uac/free-online-electronic-tax-filing-agreement-signed [https://perma.cc/8SZR-3CZA] (“On 
October 30, 2002, a public-private partnership agreement was officially signed between the IRS 
and the Free File Alliance, LLC, a group of tax software companies to make free online tax prepa-
ration and electronic filing services available to at least 60% of all individual taxpayers (i.e., 78 
million).”). The IRS recently renewed its agreement with the tax software industry through 2020. 
See IRS and Free File Alliance Reach New Agreement for Free Tax Software, IRS (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-and-free-file-alliance-reach-new-agreement-for-free-tax-soft
ware [https://perma.cc/D3DT-59GJ] (“The Internal Revenue Service and Free File Inc., also known 
as the Free File Alliance, today announced a new five-year agreement that guarantees free, federal 
tax preparation software products for 70 percent of all taxpayers.”). 
 84 Free File: I Will Choose a Free File Software, IRS, https://apps.irs.gov/app/freeFile/jsp/
index.jsp [https://perma.cc/55V5-NGGK]. 
 85 See IRS, SEVENTH MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON SERVICE STANDARDS AND 
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND FREE FILE, INCORPORATED 4 (Mar. 
6, 2015) (“[T]he federal government has pledged to not enter the tax preparation software and e-
filing services marketplace.”). 
 86 Laura Saunders, Why ‘Free File’ for Taxes Isn’t So Popular, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2015, 
10:59 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-free-file-for-taxes-isnt-so-popular-1422633546 [https://
perma.cc/V5CL-GX52]. 
 87 FREE FILE ALLIANCE, http://freefilealliance.org/ [https://perma.cc/XP3U-UWWF]. 
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tions.88 Others have pointed out that software companies like TurboTax ad-
vertise their own “free” offerings outside of the Free File Alliance website, 
which likely attract many taxpayers who are unaware of the IRS’s free-
filing website.89 The problem, commentators have noted, is that these alter-
native websites often surprise users with additional fees or suggest that they 
upgrade to a more costly software program.90 
A second example of cooperation is that tax software companies and 
the IRS have united to help combat identity fraud, a problem that has be-
come epidemic.91 Insofar as tax return preparation is concerned, this prob-
lem is particularly acute because taxpayers must convey their most vital 
personal information, such as their Social Security numbers, home address-
es, and bank account information, via regular mail or over the Internet. For 
identity theft predators, a tax return thus constitutes a treasure trove of in-
formation ready to be discovered and exploited.92 In recognition of this real-
ity, the IRS and the tax return preparation software industry have decided to 
combine their resources and work together to minimize instances of identity 
theft.93 Given that data breaches present a significant threat to the business 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Saunders, supra note 86; Samantha Sharf, You Call That Free? What TurboTax and the 




millennial/#75ce8bb968ea] (“It turns out that while all 13 members of the Free File Alliance offer 
free filing to some subset of people making as much as $62,000 this year, they restrict that by age, 
state of residence or military status.”). 
 89 See Sharf, supra note 88 (“[T]he TurboTax Federal Free Edition isn’t actually part of the 
Free File program, whereas the TurboTax Freedom Edition is.”). 
 90 Id; see also Jeremy Scott, Why the Free File Alliance Is Bad for Taxpayers, FORBES (Apr. 
15, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/04/15/why-the-free-file-alliance-
is-bad-for-taxpayers/#6b76295b651e [http://web.archive.org/web/20160304230204/http://www.
forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/04/15/why-the-free-file-alliance-is-bad-for-taxpayers/#48607ea
93246] (“Even if a taxpayer qualifies for free filing, the FFA [Free File Alliance] will still offer 
many opportunities to spend money.” (alteration in original)). 
 91 See, e.g., J. Craig Anderson, Identity Theft Growing, Costly to Victims, USA TODAY (Apr. 
14, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/ identity-
theft-growing/2082179/ [https://perma.cc/VU4P-YU3F] (“Identity theft is expected to surpass 
traditional theft as the leading form of property crime.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Herb Weisbaum, Identity Thieves Gear Up to Steal Your Tax Refund, CNBC 
NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/14/identity-thieves-gear-up-to-
steal-your-tax-refund.html [https://perma.cc/SYT8-TAGL] (“Identity theft is already a serious 
problem—the No. 1 complaint to the Federal Trade Commission, and tax-related identity theft is a 
growing part of this crime spree. In 2010, about 15 percent of all identity theft complaints to the 
FTC dealt with tax returns. In 2013, that jumped to 43 percent.”). 
 93 See, e.g., Online Return Preparation Firm Joins Anti-Tax-Fraud Effort, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
June 11, 2015, LEXIS, 2015 TNT 113-45 (explaining how the tax return preparation software indus-
try is joining with the IRS to combat identity theft); IRS, Industry, States Take New Steps Together to 
Fight Identity Theft, Protect Taxpayers, IRS (June 11, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/
IRS-and-Industry-and-States-Take-New-Steps-Together-to-Fight-Identity-Theft-and-Protect-Tax
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of tax preparation software companies,94 it is perhaps unsurprising that those 
companies have voluntarily committed to work with the government to en-
hance the security of taxpayers’ personal information. 
The prophylactic strategy to self-regulate and periodically cooperate 
with the government has worked to the advantage of the tax return prepara-
tion software industry. Due to this strategy, any suggestion that the govern-
ment prepare tax returns on behalf of taxpayers is either ignored or cast as 
an example of “Big Government” being too intrusive.95 This hands-off ap-
proach is not the stance adopted by other industrial nations. For example, in 
many European nations, at least in select instances (primarily with respect 
to their low-income taxpayers), revenue oversight agencies prepare tax re-
turns on behalf of the country’s taxpayers.96 
Historically, the tax return preparation software industry has therefore 
been at liberty to design its software packages essentially in any way it 
pleases. The result is that the computer algorithms and queries that the tax 
return preparation software industry designs are not necessarily the same as 
those that the IRS would mandate. 
The goal is to give its users a cost-efficient and, to the extent possible, 
enjoyable experience. This strategy has handsomely paid off as more tax-
payers utilize the industry’s products: according to an industry observer, 
                                                                                                                           
payers [https://perma.cc/FMA4-5NEL] (“The Internal Revenue Service joined today with repre-
sentatives of tax preparation and software firms, payroll and tax financial product processors and 
state tax administrators to announce a sweeping new collaborative effort to combat identity theft 
refund fraud and protect the nation’s taxpayers.”). 
 94 For example, regarding its annual public filing with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the owner of TurboTax, Intuit, has disclosed the following business risk: “We host, collect, 
use and retain sensitive and personal customer information and data. A security breach resulting in 
third party access to this information and data could materially disrupt our businesses, result in the 
disclosure of confidential information, significantly damage our reputation and cause material 
losses.” Intuit Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 1, 2015). 
 95 See, e.g., Lenny Goldberg, Ready Return Program Advances in Assembly, 40 ST. TAX 
NOTES 261, 261 (Apr. 21, 2006) (“The bill was opposed by Intuit, TechNet (representing the high-
tech industry, including Intuit), the American Electronics Association, and the California Taxpay-
ers’ Association. Opponents argued that the state is unfairly competing with private enterprise in 
tax preparation; that the free file program, which directs moderate income taxpayers to proprietary 
Web sites, is sufficient; and that taxpayers would be intimidated by the tax authority, despite the 
voluntary nature of the program.”); Liz Day, How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple 
Tax Filing, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 26, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-
maker-of-turbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/54YR-5FFG] (“Intuit has spent 
about $11.5 million on federal lobbying in the past five years—more than Apple or Amazon. Alt-
hough the lobbying spans a range of issues, Intuit’s disclosures pointedly note that the company 
‘opposes IRS government tax preparation.’”). 
 96 See Austan Goolsbee, The ‘Simple Return’: Reducing America’s Tax Burden Through 
Return-Free Filing, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 144-42 (“The U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury 2003) observed that, in 1999, about 87 percent of tax 
filers in Denmark and 74 percent of filers in Sweden had their returns prepared through a [Tax 
Agency Reconciliation] system.” (alteration in original)). 
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“[r]eturns filed professionally saw a 0.2 percent increase as of May 15, 
2015, over the previous year, while self-prepared returns grew a whopping 
5.8 percent. Overall, 49,195,000, or more than 40 percent of the total of 
120,612,000 e-filed returns, were filed by taxpayers who prepared the re-
turns themselves.”97 The relative pleasantness of the tax return preparation 
experience, which presumably results in an increase in software sales, how-
ever, does not necessarily yield greater tax compliance and accuracy. 
II. THE CASE FOR REGULATING TAX RETURN PREPARATION 
Having explored the liberties that Congress has extended to tax return 
preparers and the tax return preparation software industry, this Part explores 
the consequences of this noninterventionist approach and makes an affirma-
tive case for regulation in this context.98 
For much of the Code’s history, lack of regulation of the tax return 
preparation process made sense. Consider the fact that, in yesteryear, the 
majority of taxpayers routinely turned to the IRS for counsel and advice. 
Information regarding proper tax return submission was commonly dis-
pensed vis-à-vis IRS publications that many taxpayers read, analyzed, and 
applied. In addition, the IRS commonly had well-staffed walk-in centers 
that, during the busy tax season, were inundated with inquisitive taxpayers. 
If the IRS needed to convey important information, it had the eyes, ears, 
and minds of taxpayers at its beck and call. 
This is no longer the case. Instead, taxpayers now routinely rely upon 
tax return preparers and tax return preparation software for guidance.99 The 
IRS, on the other hand, has experienced significant funding cuts in recent 
years that have forced it to shrink its workforce and reduce taxpayer ser-
vices.100 More recently, the IRS has announced plans to reduce face-to-face 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Roger Russell, 2015 Tax Software Update, ACCOUNTING TODAY (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.
accountingtoday.com/news/tax-practice/2015-tax-software-update-75597-1.html [https://perma.cc/
E9ZN-P4GQ]. 
 98 See infra notes 99–174 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Susan Jones, IRS: 90% of Taxpayers Seek Help in Preparing Their Tax Returns, 
CNSNEWS.COM (Apr. 9, 2014, 6:09 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/irs-
90-taxpayers-seek-help-preparing-their-returns [https://perma.cc/3VJA-LLGV] (“According to 
[IRS Commissioner] Koskinen, about 80 million returns, or 56 percent of the total individual tax 
returns filed each year, are done by paid preparers. Another 34 percent of taxpayers use tax prepa-
ration software, making a total of 90 percent of taxpayers who seek some form of assistance.” 
(alteration in original)). 
 100 See Chuck Marr & Cecile Murray, IRS Funding Cuts Compromise Taxpayer Service and 
Weaken Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.cbpp.
org/research/federal-tax/irs-funding-cuts-compromise-taxpayer-service-and-weaken-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/T7G2-4LRR]. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget has been cut by 17 percent since 2010, 
after adjusting for inflation, forcing the IRS to reduce its workforce, severely scale 
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and telephone interactions with taxpayers.101 At least insofar as the prepara-
tion and submission processes are concerned, the IRS has essentially been 
relegated to a wallflower. In an environment in which Congress gives carte 
blanche to tax return preparers and the tax return software preparation in-
dustry to do as they please, the emergence of these new information outlets 
has significant and far-reaching implications as detailed below. Section A 
focuses on the implications of failing to regulate paid tax preparers and ar-
gues that Congress must act to empower the Treasury Department to do 
so.102 Section B then focuses on tax return software companies and argues 
for regulation in that context as well.103 
A. The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers 
Tax return preparers perform a vital function for many Americans: they 
assist taxpayers in fulfilling their legal obligation to report and pay taxes 
and may help taxpayers claim important government benefits like the EITC. 
Both the government and taxpayers have much at stake when it comes to 
accurate tax return preparation. Inaccurate tax returns may result in a signif-
icant revenue loss to the Treasury while also leaving taxpayers short on 
benefits or liable for back taxes, penalties, and interest. 
Thus, it is imperative that the government takes steps to ensure that tax 
preparers are held to a standard that is commensurate with the importance of 
their role. Taxpayers apparently agree: a recently conducted poll showed that 
                                                                                                                           
back employee training, and delay much-needed upgrades to information technology 
systems. These steps, in turn, have weakened the IRS’s ability to enforce the na-
tion’s tax laws and serve taxpayers efficiently, as the National Taxpayer Advocate, 
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, the IRS Oversight Board, 
and the Government Accountability Office have all documented. 
Id. 
 101 See Future State Initiative, IRS (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/future-
state-initiative [https://perma.cc/CSJ5-J8VM] (noting that one goal of the Future State Initiative is 
to make taxpayer services more cost effective by shifting more of those services online); see also 
The President’s Fiscal Year 2017 Budget: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th 
Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of John A. Koskinen, Comm’r, IRS) [hereinafter Koskinen Statement]. 
We need to be, and are, looking forward to a new, improved way of doing business 
that involves a more robust online taxpayer experience. This is driven, in part, by busi-
ness imperatives; when it costs between $40 and $60 to interact with a taxpayer in per-
son, and less than $1 to interact online, we must reexamine how we provide the best 
possible taxpayer experience, in response to taxpayer expectations and demands. 
Koskinen Statement, supra, at 3. 
 102 See infra notes 104–141 and accompanying text. 
 103 See infra notes 142–174 and accompanying text. 
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eighty percent of the public supports regulations that would require paid tax 
return preparers to become licensed and pass a competency exam.104 
Among many reasons for regulating tax return preparers are that (1) tax 
return preparation involves complex legal rules; (2) unregulated tax return 
preparers are prone to making errors; (3) tax return preparation involves the 
distribution of vital government benefits to the poor; (4) relative to ex post 
regulation, ex ante regulation of preparers is likely more efficient; and (5) 
failure to regulate may diminish the public’s faith in the government. 
1. Complexity of Tax Return Preparation 
At the heart of the 2014 Loving v. IRS decision was the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s finding that tax return preparation does not 
constitute the “practice” of representing taxpayers before the Treasury De-
partment.105 In making their case that the Treasury Department lacked au-
thority to regulate tax return preparation, the plaintiffs and other groups that 
opposed the regulations argued that “merely” preparing a tax return was 
akin to being a bookkeeper, a job someone can do without giving substan-
tive legal advice.106 
The fact is, however, that preparing tax returns involves interacting 
with an incredibly complicated set of legal rules.107 The very reason that the 
majority of taxpayers turn to assistance in preparing their returns each year 
is because the process is difficult and intimidating.108 Although some re-
turns may be relatively simple (for example, taxpayers who earn only wage 
                                                                                                                           
 104 MICHAEL BEST & TOM FELTNER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., PUBLIC VIEWS ON PAID TAX 
PREPARATION: STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NEW CONSUMER PROTECTIONS TO PREVENT ER-
RORS AND FRAUD 4 (2016) (reporting that 80% of people surveyed support tax return preparer 
testing and 83% of those surveyed support licensing). The foregoing report further indicates that 
56% of those surveyed also thought tax return preparers needed special training but not a degree in 
tax preparation, while 40% thought a college degree was necessary; only 3% did not think training 
is necessary. Id. at 6. 
 105 See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 54, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(No. 13-5061) (“Merely preparing a tax return for a paying customer is not an act of representa-
tion; a tax-return preparer is no more a ‘representative’ than an outside bookkeeper who is hired 
annually to organize accounts[.]”); Brief for the Tax Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Loving, 742 F.3d 1013 (No. 13-5061) (“[In many circumstances,] there is no 
advice given by the preparer to the taxpayer, no identification for the taxpayer of items or issues 
for which the law is unclear, and no informing of the taxpayer of the benefits or risks of positions 
taken on the return.” (alteration in original)). 
 107 See, e.g., Grove v. Comm’r, 490 F.2d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 1973) (“We are called upon again, 
to wrestle with the tangled web that is the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
 108 Cf. Olson, supra note 37, at 767 (“Taxpayers hire preparers because the tax code is hide-
ously complex, return preparation is anything but straightforward, and a lot of money is on the 
line.”). 
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income and claim the standard deduction),109 the majority of returns involve 
complicating factors like itemized deductions, the EITC, or the alternative 
minimum tax, all of which mandate an understanding of complex, substan-
tive tax rules. In many circumstances, tax return preparation goes well be-
yond the work of a “mere scrivener.”110 
What’s more, there is nothing to stop an untrained tax return preparer 
from preparing the most complicated tax returns, whether they’re done ac-
curately or not. Those undertaking such work surely should be trained in 
substantive tax law and have to demonstrate their proficiency. Yet, more 
than half of tax returns are prepared by unregulated preparers: that is, they 
are prepared by people who are not attorneys, CPAs, or enrolled agents.111 
2. Fiscal Consequences of Tax Return Preparer Incompetency 
The most significant, and entirely predictable, consequence of Con-
gress’s failure to regulate tax return preparers is that many tax return pre-
parers make errors on taxpayers’ returns. As a result, large numbers of tax-
payers pay less tax than they owe,112 contributing to the tax gap’s girth. 
(Other taxpayers forfeit vital government benefits that were not properly 
claimed on their tax return.) For example, one study conducted by the GAO 
of commercial tax preparation chains found an incorrect refund claimed by 
seventeen of the nineteen preparers evaluated.113 Common errors included 
failing to report self-employment income and claiming an ineligible child 
for purposes of the EITC.114 Additionally, an IRS study showed that the 
overclaim rate on EITC returns prepared by uncredentialed tax return pre-
parers during 2006 and 2007 was over fifty percent; by comparison, this 
rate was higher than the overclaim rate on self-prepared claims during that 
same time period.115 
There are multiple reasons for so many erroneous tax returns. Some 
unscrupulous tax return preparers intentionally omit income from returns, 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 121–22 (approximately 40% of taxpayers claim the stand-
ard deduction and earn only income that is subject to information reporting). 
 110 See Olson, supra note 37, at 770. 
 111 See id. at 769 n.14 (citing IRS COMPLIANCE DATA WAREHOUSE, INDIVIDUAL RETURNS 
TRANSACTION FILE AND RETURN PREPARERS AND PROVIDERS DATABASE (2013)). In 2011, 
42,154,527 out of 78,088,554 returns (approximately 54%) were prepared by “unregulated prepar-
ers,” meaning they were not attorneys, certified accountants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, 
enrolled retirement plan agents, or preparers regulated by a state. See id. 
 112 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining the tax gap). 
 113 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4. 
 114 See id.  
 115 See IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 
2006–2008 RETURNS 26 tbl.9 (2014). The study estimates that up to 54% of returns by “unen-
rolled return preparers” were overclaims, compared to up to 47% of self-prepared returns. Id. 
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claim false deductions, or overclaim refundable credits like the EITC. Nu-
merous “mystery shopper” tests conducted by advocacy groups across the 
country have uncovered such abuses by unregulated tax return preparers.116 
For example, one tax return preparer in New York City fabricated a $2000 
church donation to increase the tester’s refund, another advised a tester not 
to report income that had not been reported on a Form 1099, and yet anoth-
er fraudulently changed the tester’s filing status from single to head of 
household to increase the refund claimed from $100 to $6000.117 Not only 
does this type of misconduct shortchange the federal government of sub-
stantial amounts of tax revenue, but taxpayers will also be held accountable 
for back taxes, interest, and possibly penalties if the IRS detects their non-
compliance.118 Further, taxpayers can be barred from claiming the EITC for 
a period of ten years if they are found to have fraudulently claimed it when 
ineligible; the ban is two years if their claim was found to be reckless but 
not fraudulent.119 Although the tax return preparers themselves are also lia-
ble for penalties for filing fraudulent tax returns,120 many of them disappear 
after tax season and are virtually impossible for the IRS (or, for that matter, 
taxpayers) to track down.121 
Other tax return preparers may stop short of outright evasion but en-
courage more aggressive reporting positions than taxpayers might otherwise 
take on their own. Many taxpayers, in turn, operate under the mistaken im-
pression that if they use a tax return preparer, such reliance automatically 
insulates them from accuracy-related penalties,122 which may make them 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See generally WU, supra note 12 (detailing results of “mystery shopper” testing by advo-
cacy groups). 
 117 Id. at 7, 8, 13. 
 118 See Tax Return Preparer Fraud, IRS (July 16, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/tax-return-
preparer-fraud-2 [https://perma.cc/4GUV-89SE] (“However, when the IRS detects the false return, 
the taxpayer—not the return preparer—must pay the additional taxes and interest and may be 
subject to penalties.”); Heather Somerville, Tax Preparer Fraud Creates Big Refunds, Big Prob-
lems for Taxpayers, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016, 7:38 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/
ci_22827278/tax-preparer-fraud-creates-big-refunds-big-problems [https://perma.cc/5G5A-RVVJ] 
(“The damage those tax preparers committed on the tax return is still the consumer’s problem to 
deal with.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 119 I.R.C. § 32(k) (2012). 
 120 See id. § 6694(b) (understatement due to willful or reckless conduct); id. § 6695(g) (failure 
to comply with EITC due diligence requirements); id. § 6701 (aiding and abetting understatement 
of tax liability); id. § 7206 (felony for assistance on fraudulent return); id. § 7207 (misdemeanor 
for delivery of fraudulent return); id. § 7407 (authority for district court to enjoin tax return pre-
parer). 
 121 See Somerville, supra note 118. 
 122 Reliance upon tax professionals may insulate taxpayers from accuracy-related tax penal-
ties if such reliance is found to be reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. See I.R.C. 
§ 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2003); see, e.g., Estate of Goldman v. Comm’r, 112 
T.C. 317, 324–25 (1999), aff’d, Schutter v. Comm’r, 242 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 2000) (relying upon 
an opinion letter prepared by experienced tax counsel, taxpayer demonstrated reasonable cause 
2017] Regulating Tax Return Preparation 173 
more inclined to accept risky tax positions. Finally, it is inevitable that tax 
return preparers will make unintentional errors on tax returns, and this is 
particularly true for those who lack training and other qualifications. Even if 
these errors are innocent, they contribute to the tax gap all the same. 
In addition to making mistakes or committing outright fraud, many un-
regulated tax return preparers charge exorbitant fees and high interest rates 
on taxpayer loans, which are often not disclosed up front to taxpayers.123 
For example, in 2012 the U.S. Department of Justice brought suit against a 
tax preparation service whose “junk fees typically average[d] more than 
$400–$500, and sometimes [ran] as high as $1,000 for as little as 15 minutes 
of tax return preparation.”124 Many tax return preparers also offer products 
like refund anticipation loans (“RALs”), which essentially allow taxpayers 
to borrow their tax preparation fee out of their refund at a high rate of inter-
est, or refund anticipation checks (“RACs”), which allow taxpayers without 
a bank account to obtain a quicker refund in exchange for additional fees.125 
Customers claiming refunds are particularly vulnerable to high fees because 
the fees are deducted from their refund and are therefore not as salient or 
painful.126 Additionally, some retailers like jewelry stores or car dealers dou-
ble as tax return preparers and encourage their clientele to apply their re-
fund toward a major purchase.127 The targets of these predatory practices 
are usually low-income taxpayers,128 who can least afford to squander their 
precious resources on faulty return preparation and unnecessary fees. 
                                                                                                                           
and good faith in deducting payments to his ex-wife as alimony); Fowler v. Comm’r, 84 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 281, 287 (2002) (holding that taxpayers who deducted losses from their rental properties 
were not liable for the negligence penalty where they relied on their return preparer, who was a 
CPA and tax partner in his firm); Favia v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1876, 1878 (2002) (even 
though the claimed loss was disallowed, the Tax Court did not impose accuracy-related penalty 
because the taxpayer relied on the good-faith advice of a tax professional). Nevertheless, to assert 
a successful accuracy-related penalty defense, a taxpayer must show that a “competent profession-
al who had sufficient expertise” gave the relied-upon advice. Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 
115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), aff’d, 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, taxpayers who do not make a 
good-faith effort to ascertain the correctness of the advice rendered may not be able to assert a 
reasonable cause defense. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) ex.2. 
 123 WU, supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 124 Id. at 16 (alteration in original) (citing Complaint, United States v. Ogbazion, 2012 WL 
4364306 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2012) (No. 3:12-cv-95)). The “junk fees” were those in addition to 
the tax preparation service fees and included things like data storage fees, processing fees, and 
filing fees. Id. at n.47. 
 125 See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 2–3. Federal bank regulations have done away 
with RALs offered by major banks although some smaller businesses—like payday lenders—still 
offer them. Id. at 2, 5. RACs have largely replaced RALs as the “dominant tax-time financial 
product on the market.” Id. at 3. 
 126 See WU, supra note 12, at 16; WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 5. 
 127 WU, supra note 12, at 4; see IRS, supra note 4, at 12. 
 128 See IRS, supra note 4, at 11; WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 3. 
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3. Administration of Government Benefits Through the Tax System 
In failing to regulate tax return preparation, the government has more 
at stake than just lost tax revenue. The tax system also is used to administer 
social welfare programs that come in the form of refundable tax credits, 
such as the EITC,129 the child tax credit,130 and the recently enacted premi-
um tax credit (covering health-care costs).131 
The fact that unlicensed, untrained individuals can be in charge of dis-
persing government benefits to low-income taxpayers for a fee is astonish-
ing when viewed in the context of other social welfare programs. Consider 
the disbursement of food stamps, Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (i.e., welfare). Though funded with federal dollars, these 
benefits are generally disbursed by the states,132 often at the county level, by 
qualified professionals. In North Carolina, for example, a caseworker as-
signed to determine eligibility for food stamps, welfare, and/or Medicaid is 
a trained state employee who generally has a college degree or comparable 
experience and reports to a supervisor.133 Yet, any person in any line of 
work or vocation—a car dealer, a pawnshop owner, or a furniture retail-
er134—can prepare a tax return claiming an EITC refund worth thousands of 
dollars and command a hefty fee for doing so. 
The government clearly has an interest in maximizing accuracy when 
it comes to delivery of funds through its social welfare programs. Yet, IRS 
data reveals that when unregulated tax return preparers help taxpayers claim 
the EITC, the returns are inaccurate in the majority of cases.135 Tax returns 
that fail to claim valuable benefits deprive the taxpayer of much-needed 
assistance, and tax returns that overclaim those benefits shortchange the 
fisc. These issues further underscore the need for Congress to regulate tax 
return preparation. 
                                                                                                                           
 129 I.R.C. § 32 (2012). 
 130 Id. § 24. 
 131 Id. § 36B. 
 132 See Government Benefits, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/benefits [https://perma.cc/8WM3-
KUXG] (listing the availability of social welfare programs and pointing out that most are adminis-
tered at the state level). 
 133 See, e.g., Buncombe County: Income Maintenance Caseworker I, N.C. SOC. SERVS. JOBS, 
https://ssw.unc.edu/dssjobsnc/node/764 [https://perma.cc/PM9Y-VVGX] (college degree or rele-
vant, comparable experience required); Harnett County Job: Income Maintenance Caseworker I, 
N.C. SOC. SERVS. JOBS, https://ssw.unc.edu/dssjobsnc/index.php?q=node/406 [https://perma.cc/
2REM-EJEH] (same). 
 134 See, e.g., WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 1, 18. For example, one online business 
offers a service called “Tax Max,” which specializes in helping auto dealers and payday lenders 
prepare tax returns. Id. at 20. Tax Max helps auto dealers estimate customers’ tax refunds in ad-
vance of the tax-filing season so that the customers can apply their refund toward a down payment 
on a car in November or December. Id. 
 135 See IRS, supra note 115, at 26 tbl.9. 
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4. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Regulations 
Another argument asserted by the plaintiffs in Loving was that tax re-
turn preparer regulation is redundant given the array of civil and criminal 
penalties applicable to tax return preparers that are already at the IRS’s dis-
posal.136 It is certainly true that shoddy tax return preparation is not without 
potential consequences. The government can fine and, at times, prosecute 
tax return preparers who prepare inaccurate, reckless, and/or fraudulent re-
turns and can enjoin bad actors from engaging in future tax return prepara-
tion.137 
Although these penalties have been asserted against some preparers 
and no doubt carry a deterrent effect on many others, they come with signif-
icant limitations. First, the imposition of return preparer penalties requires 
that the IRS actually detect noncompliance on the taxpayer’s return and that 
such noncompliance is attributable to the taxpayer’s preparer. The IRS’s 
limited budget, however, enables it to audit only a tiny percentage of returns 
each year,138 which means that the vast majority of noncompliant returns 
will go undetected. Second, even if taxpayer noncompliance is detected, I 
tis highly unlikely that the IRS will expend more resources to analyze tax 
return preparers and possibly commence criminal proceedings against 
them.139 Third, even if taxpayers and their accountable tax return preparers 
are caught and prosecuted, such measures consume valuable government 
resources. Relying solely on an ex post regime to police noncompliant tax 
return preparers is thus costly and casts a very small net. 
A much more efficient and robust regime would combine the current ex 
post penalty regime with an ex ante regime, i.e., licensing requirements that 
must be met before a person could prepare tax returns. An ex ante regime is a 
better use of government resources because the cost of administering re-
quirements like licensing and testing would undoubtedly be far less burden-
some than auditing and prosecuting bad actors on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 40–50, Loving, 742 F.3d 1013 (No. 13-5061). The 
Loving court viewed the existing penalty framework as carrying some weight in its decision to 
strike down the regulations. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1020 (“[W]e find at least some significance in the 
fact that multiple Congresses have acted as if Section 330 did not extend so broadly as to cover 
tax-return preparers.”). 
 137 See supra note 120 (penalty provisions). 
 138 See IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2015 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 2 (2015) (indicating 
that the individual audit rate was .84%). The audit rate for returns claiming the EITC is higher 
than the overall audit rate but is still under 2%. See IRS, supra note 30, at 23. 
 139 In 2015, the IRS audited 1,228,117 individual returns and recommended prosecution for 
tax crimes in only 1762, or 0.14%, of those cases. See IRS, supra note 138, at 2, 5. 
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5. Potential Loss of Public Faith in the Government’s Ability to Govern 
Aside from revenue loss and inaccuracy in the delivery of government 
benefits, another implication of not regulating the tax preparation return 
industry is that it may produce a loss of faith in the government and its abil-
ity to govern. Consider the fact that in the twenty-first century there are 
sparse points of direct contact between individual taxpayers and the federal 
government. There is, for example, no compulsory military service, and, 
due to the Internet and e-mail, even interactions with the U.S. postal system 
have significantly dwindled. 
The area of annual tax return submissions remains one of the few areas 
in which taxpayers’ private and public lives regularly intersect. This pre-
sents Congress with the unique opportunity to foster both tax compliance 
and what at least one commentator labels our bonds of “fiscal citizenship,” 
or “the important civic purpose of recognizing and formalizing the financial 
responsibilities of citizenship.”140 Nevertheless, if the annual tax-filing ritu-
al is beset with unscrupulous tax return preparers who prey on low- and 
middle-income taxpayers, this does not bode well for fiscal citizenship. Fur-
thermore, the bonds of fiscal citizenship are likewise weakened when the 
tax return preparation software industry habitually denigrates the federal 
government via statements that strongly imply that, if left to its druthers, 
Congress might abscond with citizens’ tax dollars (for example, in advertis-
ing campaigns, asking, “Are you sure you’re getting your full refund?”).141  
Another implication of Congress’s carte blanche approach is that it 
may result in the nation revamping the way it raises revenue. From an ad-
ministrative perspective, if the tax return preparation process is deemed too 
burdensome to maintain and produces flawed and inaccurate returns, tax-
payers may force the government to choose an alternative way to raise rev-
enue (for example, a national sales tax). What gets lost in the ongoing polit-
ical debates regarding the income tax, however, is that if Congress were to 
regulate the tax return preparation process, such regulation might go a long 
way toward addressing and allaying taxpayers’ concerns about the prepara-
tion and submission processes, as well as ameliorating compliance short-
comings. 
B. The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparation Software Companies 
Many of the arguments discussed in the previous section regarding the 
need to regulate tax return preparers apply with equal force to tax return 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 4. 
 141 Antony Young, It’s Tax Day: H&R Block vs. TurboTax, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://adage.com/article/media/tax-day-h-r-block-turbotax/135926/ [https://perma.cc/GZC5-QJQU]. 
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preparation software. Like third-party preparers, software programs often 
stand as a vital intermediary between the taxpayer and the government, af-
fecting both revenue collection and the distribution of government benefits. 
Although tax preparation software allows the taxpayer to complete her re-
turn without assistance from another person, the role of software is often 
nearly identical to that of a tax return preparer, making the government’s 
regulatory interest equally compelling. 
1. Function as a Return Preparer 
When the Treasury Department enacted the now-defunct tax return 
preparer regulations in 2011, it did not include tax return preparation soft-
ware in the new regime.142 That decision is somewhat understandable as the 
regulations focused on competency examinations and continuing education 
that would not necessarily be relevant in the context of software. Although 
the precise rules governing paid preparers versus tax return preparation 
software developers might need to be different, this does not mean that 
Congress does not have an equally vital interest in regulating tax return 
preparation software as a type of tax return preparer.143 
First, consider the fact that preparing one’s own return with tax prepa-
ration software is, in many circumstances, not much different than paying a 
third party (who is likely to use the same or a similar software program) to 
prepare the return.144 A taxpayer who walks into a national tax preparation 
chain is likely to be asked a series of questions while the preparer enters 
information into a computer program. Similarly, using tax preparation soft-
ware at home generally involves reading through a series of interview-style 
questions. TurboTax, for example, offers users a guided experience: the 
program asks them about numerous items of income and deductions to de-
termine what should be reported.145 Taxpayers type in answers to the vari-
ous questions, and the software transfers these responses, when relevant, to 
the appropriate tax return line items. 
Most tax software programs are also capable of automatically import-
ing entries from information returns like Form W-2 (wage income), Form 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 143 The vast majority of tax return preparers use tax software as well. See Paul Bonner, 2015 
Tax Software Survey, TAX ADVISER (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2015/
aug/2015-tax-software-survey.html [https://perma.cc/EK5F-X9YB]. 
 144 The major tax return preparation software companies offer software programs specifically 
for tax return preparers. See, e.g., INTUIT PROCONNECT, https://taxpro.intuit.com/ [https://perma.
cc/57PV-J665] (maker of TurboTax); TAXACT PROF., https://www.taxact.com/professional/ [https://
perma.cc/8KW3-VEWE]. 
 145 See, e.g., How TurboTax Works, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/best-tax-software/
how-it-works.jsp [https://perma.cc/HF9N-EPPW] (“Simply tell us what you do for a living, if you 
own a home, if you have any children, and about any charitable donations you made this year.”). 
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1099 (for example, interest income from a bank account), or Form 1098 (for 
example, deductible mortgage interest).146 Once the software program im-
ports the information, it is automatically transferred to the appropriate line 
on the taxpayer’s return, arguably making the software program, not the 
taxpayer, the “preparer.” Taxpayers with relatively simple tax situations (for 
example, those with W-2 income who claim the standard deduction) need 
only make a few keystrokes, and voilà, the tax return software does the rest 
and produces a tax return. 
Second, there is some precedent for treating tax return preparation 
software developers as tax return preparers. For example, in Revenue Rul-
ing 85-189, the IRS ruled that a tax software developer is considered a “tax 
return preparer” for purposes of § 7701(a)(36),147 stating thus: “[The soft-
ware developer] is considered a preparer with respect to [the taxpayer’s] 
return because [the software developer’s] computer program provides more 
than mere mechanical assistance. Substantive determinations are performed 
by [the] computer program concerning the application of . . . the Code.”148 
In the same ruling, the IRS also concluded that the software developer 
could be potentially subject to a subset of penalties applicable to tax return 
preparers.149 
In a similar vein, some taxpayers have successfully defended them-
selves against civil penalties by asserting that they relied on tax return prep-
aration software, invoking what has become known in common parlance as 
the “TurboTax Defense.”150 For example, in Thompson v. Commissioner,151 
the IRS had disallowed the taxpayer’s claimed business deductions and as-
serted a negligence penalty under § 6662(a). The negligence penalty can 
generally be avoided in those circumstances when taxpayers can demon-
strate that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith, which may 
include reasonable reliance on a tax adviser.152 The Thompson court agreed 
that the deduction should be disallowed but found that the taxpayer was not 
liable for a negligence penalty.153 Although the court did not explicitly ad-
                                                                                                                           
 146 Id. (“Automatically import your W-2 tax form information directly into your TurboTax 
return from over a million participating employers and financial institutions.”). 
 147 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (2012) (defining “tax return preparer” as “any person who prepares 
for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, any return of 
tax imposed by this title or any claim for refund of tax imposed by this title”). 
 148 Rev. Rul. 85-189, 1985-2 C.B. 341 (alteration in original). 
 149 Id. (software developer was potentially liable for penalty under § 7216 (unauthorized dis-
closure of information by return preparers) but not liable for understatement penalties because the 
software developer had “no involvement with the actual preparation of the return”). 
 150 See generally Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX 
REV. 443 (2014) (explaining the logistics and tactics associated with utilizing this defense). 
 151 Thompson v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 25 (2007). 
 152 See supra note 122. 
 153 See Thompson, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) at 25. 
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dress the issue of whether tax preparation software constitutes a tax adviser, 
it found the taxpayer’s reliance on software relevant for purposes of avoid-
ing the negligence penalty, stating that the “petitioner made a reasonable 
attempt to comply with the internal revenue laws and exercised ordinary 
and reasonable care by obtaining software to aid him in the preparation of 
his 2002 Federal income tax return.”154 
Given the substantial similarities between tax return preparers and tax 
preparation software, the need to regulate tax software companies is logical. 
Failing to regulate tax software, however, also presents additional, unique 
challenges to the tax system, which are discussed below. 
2. Potential to Reduce Compliance 
Tax return preparation software presents subtle but potentially signifi-
cant compliance challenges for the government. On the one hand, the issues 
of fraud and incompetence related to unregulated preparers are largely irrel-
evant in this context. On the other hand, software companies, like paid pre-
parers, operate with fees and repeat business in mind, which inevitably en-
tails minimizing the taxpayer’s bill or maximizing his refund. Thus, alt-
hough the software companies may operate within fully legal boundaries, 
from a tax revenue standpoint, there are three troubling features associated 
with tax return preparation software. 
First, tax return preparation software may encourage taxpayers to take 
aggressive reporting positions. One reason for such aggressive reporting 
might be that taxpayers believe that they can claim ignorance and/or rely on 
the TurboTax defense if their return is audited.155 This problem is further 
exacerbated by the fact that tax return preparation software packages often 
have so-called “audit risk meters” that portend how likely a particular return 
is to be audited.156 If the meter is green (indicating low audit risk), taxpay-
ers may decide to take more aggressive positions or may feel emboldened to 
take intentionally false positions with the assurance that they are unlikely to 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Id. In Olsen v. Commissioner, the taxpayer also avoided a penalty based on software use. 
Olsen v. Comm’r, No. 11658-10S, 2011 WL 5885082, at *1 (T.C. Nov. 23, 2011). Nevertheless, 
other taxpayers have been unsuccessful in asserting the TurboTax defense. See, e.g., Bunney v. 
Comm’r, 114 T.C. 259, 267 (2000) (“[T]ax preparation software is only as good as the infor-
mation one inputs into it.”); see also Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347, 1349 (2010) (“We 
do not accept petitioners’ misuse of TurboTax, even if unintentional or accidental, as a defense to 
the penalties on the basis of the facts presented.”). 
 155 See supra notes 150–154 and accompanying text. 
 156 See Terry Savage, New TurboTax Helps You Fly Under IRS Radar, THESTREET (Feb. 10, 
2008, 10:05 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10402683/1/new-turbotax-helps-you-fly-under-
irs-radar.html [https://perma.cc/H5WC-N3P4] (“This year, the popular software program has a 
new feature called the ‘Audit Risk Meter,’ which is designed to help you lessen the chance of your 
return being chosen for this extra scrutiny.”). 
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get caught. It is particularly troubling that software companies are able to 
display information about low audit risk to taxpayers because regulated re-
turn preparers like CPAs and lawyers are ethically precluded by Circular 
230 from considering audit risk in rendering their tax advice.157 Further-
more, for an additional fee, tax return preparation software companies gen-
erally offer so-called “Audit Defense” from the IRS.158 This kind of insur-
ance can motivate taxpayers to take aggressive or false tax return positions 
even if their audit risk is not low, with the expectation that little or no finan-
cial harm can befall them. 
A second problem is that tax return software programs often oversim-
plify the law,159 enabling taxpayers to conceptualize favorable interpreta-
tions upon which they may seek to minimize their tax burden. Tax software 
is, in fact, intentionally designed to help taxpayers maximize their deduc-
tions without a symmetrical effort to maximize income reported.160 Indeed, 
one recent empirical study showed that taxpayers who file their taxes online 
claim more itemized deductions and report lower effective tax rates.161 Alt-
hough educating taxpayers about itemized deductions to which they are en-
titled is arguably a positive aspect of tax software, the government is still 
harmed from a revenue perspective if the net effect of software use is more 
deductions claimed but no increase in income reported. 
Finally, displaying the taxpayer’s refund or balance due status continu-
ously throughout the tax return preparation process may also cause more 
aggressive and/or less compliant tax reporting. The major tax software pro-
grams include a “prepayment-position status bar,” which shows the taxpay-
er’s expected refund or balance due on the top of the screen during the tax 
                                                                                                                           
 157 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a)(2) (2015). 
 158 See Dan Caplinger, Audit Insurance: Here’s Probably Why You Don’t Need It, DAILY FIN. 
(May 15, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/05/15/audit-insurance-you-dont-need-
it/ [https://perma.cc/ME2K-SZVL] (describing what audit defense services provide). 
 159 Joshua Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66 EMORY 
L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1–2). 
 160 For example, TurboTax advertises the following product: “TurboTax Deluxe: Maximize 
Your Deductions.” Among several features on the product’s website is the “Deduction Finder,” 
which states, “We’ll search for more than 350 tax deductions and credits to get you the biggest tax 
refund—guaranteed.” See TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/deluxe.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/74HC-PHQS]. A similar description on the website of TaxAct states, “Maximize 
your deductions and minimize your taxes with TaxAct Plus. All the forms & features you need are 
included so you get your guaranteed maximum refund.” See TAXACT, https://www.taxact.com/
individual-taxes/download/plus/ [https://perma.cc/E56K-5C89]. 
 161 Samara Gunter, Your Biggest Refund Guaranteed? Internet Access, Tax Filing Method 
and Reported Tax Liability 1 (May 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://drive.
google.com/file/d/0B4snyKeCkR6pRmJ5SVV4WUJyNkU/view [https://perma.cc/C6W7-HNAP]. 
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preparation process.162 As the taxpayer enters items of income or deduc-
tions, the refund or balance status continually changes. Thus, a taxpayer 
who enters information that causes her refund to shrink or the balance due 
to go up might delete that information if she does not like the result. Other 
taxpayers might experiment with multiple variations of reporting until they 
achieve the outcome they desire. In a recent empirical study, this behavioral 
response was observed. More specifically, the study found that taxpayers 
facing a balance due reported less income when they could observe a pre-
payment-position status bar as compared to those that could not continuous-
ly view their prepayment position.163 Additionally, in a field study of small-
business tax evasion, surveyed participants indicated that using tax prepara-
tion software helps them “back in” to their desired tax outcomes.164 
3. Potential to Mislead Taxpayers About Fees and Free Filing 
In addition to having a potentially negative impact on tax compliance, 
tax return preparation software also presents consumer protection issues. 
Specifically, fees charged by tax return preparation software companies are 
often hidden, surprising, and confusing. When it comes to assessing fees, at 
a particular disadvantage are low-income taxpayers, who may attempt to 
use a “free” file service and then be unexpectedly charged fees that may 
have been avoidable. As discussed above in Part I.B., the Free File Alliance 
program ostensibly allows low-income taxpayers to file their returns for 
free by choosing a private software company service from the IRS’s Free 
File website.165 Some taxpayers who use the Free File Alliance, however, 
are subsequently upsold on fee-based products, and most are charged fees 
for their state returns.166 Other taxpayers may mistake separate fee-based 
                                                                                                                           
 162 William Brink, The Social Science of Tax Preparation Software, SOC. SCI. SPACE (Apr. 8, 
2016), http://www.socialsciencespace.com/2016/04/the-social-science-of-tax-preparation-software/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y4TW-QQFV]. 
 163 See William D. Brink & Lorraine S. Lee, The Effect of Tax Preparation Software on Tax 
Compliance: A Research Note, 27 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 121, 130–31 (2015) (by having subjects 
choose an amount of cash income to report, the study’s authors gauged aggressiveness and eva-
sion: subjects were told that due to poor record keeping, tip income was uncertain but estimated to 
be somewhere in the range of $6500 to $10,000; subjects facing a balance due reported an average 
of $859.06 more cash tip income when the prepayment-position status bar was absent compared to 
when it was present). 
 164 Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
37, 59 (2009). 
 165 See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 166 See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Intuit’s Nine Lies Kill State E-Filing Programs and Keep 
‘Free’ File Alive, 57 STATE TAX NOTES 555, 561–62 (Aug. 30, 2010) (explaining how the Free 
File program operates in actual practice). 
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websites for the IRS’s Free File site due to intentional marketing practices 
on the part of software companies.167 
Even taxpayers who don’t qualify for free filing may be surprised by 
hidden fees. For example, one common practice of software companies ap-
pears to be to advertise a no-cost or low-cost service, allow taxpayers to 
begin preparing their tax returns, and then inform them midway through the 
tax return completion process that they must upgrade to a more expensive 
product to complete their return.168 
4. Power of the Tax Return Preparation Software Lobby 
Finally, it is worth noting that the tax return preparation software in-
dustry has been a powerful lobby against tax reform in an area closely relat-
ed to compliance: tax return simplification. Specifically, over the years, tax 
return preparation software companies like Intuit have successfully lobbied 
to prevent the government from developing its own, free tax return prepara-
tion software and from offering taxpayers the option to receive a prepopu-
lated tax return, known as the “Simple Return.”169 Allowing those taxpayers 
with uncomplicated tax situations to avoid return preparation with a Simple 
Return would save an estimated 225 million hours of time and over $2 bil-
lion in tax preparation fees each year.170 Yet, measures in Congress to enact 
a Simple Return bill have all stalled.171 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See Sharf, supra note 88. 
 168 See, e.g., Phil Villarreal, TurboTax Charged Me $60 for Not-So-Free Online Taxes, CON-
SUMERIST (Apr. 16, 2010), https://consumerist.com/2010/04/16/turbotax-charged-me-60-for-not-
so-free-free-online-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/SA3P-ZMMV] (“When filing my taxes last night, 
TurboTax online’s ‘Free’ tax preparation and online filing ended up costing me about 60$ [sic]. 
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 169 See, e.g., Day, supra note 95 (“Well, for one thing, it doesn’t help that [Simple Returns 
have] been opposed for years by the company behind the most popular consumer tax software—
Intuit, maker of TurboTax.” (alteration in original)); Scott, supra note 90 (“Even if a taxpayer 
qualifies for free filing, the FFA will still offer many opportunities to spend money.”); see also 
Austan Goolsbee, The ‘Simple Return’: Reducing America’s Tax Burden Through Return-Free 
Filing, HAMILTON PROJECT 19–20 (2006) (arguing that instituting a Simple Return process would 
not infringe on private enterprise). 
 170 See Goolsbee, supra note 169, at 5. 
 171 See, e.g., H.R. 1069, 112th Cong. (2011); Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act 
of 2011, S. 727, 112th Cong. (2011). Senator Elizabeth Warren has introduced a bill in Congress 
that would require the government to develop free tax return preparation software and offer pre-
populated returns to taxpayers with simple tax situations. See Tax Filing Simplification Act of 
2016, S. 2789, 114th Cong. (2016). 
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These tax return preparation software industry campaigns to preserve 
the industry’s economic turf have not stopped at the federal level but have 
extended to state legislatures as well. These legislative efforts include lob-
bying against California’s “ReadyReturn” (a prepopulated state return)172 
and free electronic filing in Virginia.173 The software industry’s efforts to 
torpedo tax return simplification measures at the state level have been in-
tense, well-funded, and relentless. 
Intuit’s public financial disclosures indicate that free, government-
provided tax preparation software is a significant threat to its business,174 
which explains why Intuit and other software companies have invested so 
much time and so many resources lobbying Congress and state legislatures 
to prevent free, simplified return filing measures. Such measures, however, 
are surely in the best interests of taxpayers and are likely in the govern-
ment’s best interest as well. If nothing more, the failed history of the federal 
Simple Return demonstrates the urgent need for congressional regulation of 
tax return software companies. When private industry is able to dominate 
both the tax return preparation process and the political process surrounding 
tax return preparation, the interest of the taxpaying public is undoubtedly 
wrongly subjugated. 
III. REGULATING TAX RETURN PREPARATION 
Clearly, the status quo regarding tax return preparation is rife with 
shortcomings, and over the past several years, a lack of IRS funding has 
exacerbated the implications associated with Congress’s abdication of its 
oversight role. Recent cuts to the IRS budget have been dramatic and devas-
tating.175 This has resulted in long lines at service centers, telephone calls 
that go unanswered, and fewer audits being conducted.176 With the IRS at 
an increasing loss to help taxpayers fulfill their civic duties, taxpayers have 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 122. 
 173 See Scott, supra note 90 (“The [Free File Alliance] persuaded the Virginia Legislature to 
scrap [its electronic filing site] several years ago, replacing it with an FFA portal similar to that of 
the IRS’s and causing some taxpayers to have to pay [concomitant fees.]” (alteration in original)). 
 174 See id. 
 175 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCED 
BUDGETS AND COLLECTION RESOURCES HAVE RESULTED IN DECLINES IN TAXPAYER SERVICES, 
CASE CLOSURES, AND DOLLARS COLLECTED (May 8, 2015) (“Since Fiscal Year 2010, decreases 
in the budget have resulted in the reduction of 21 percent of Automated Collection Service (ACS) 
contact representatives and 28 percent of Field Collection revenue officers.”). 
 176 See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, Report: Budget Cuts Weaken IRS Operations, USA TODAY (June 
17, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/06/17/irs-budget-cuts-hurt-services/28869343/ 
[https://perma.cc/6NCZ-A5DT] (“Since 2011, the personnel reductions resulted in a 25% drop in 
taxpayer phone calls answered by remaining IRS Automated Collection Service workers, the report 
said. . . . IRS Field Collection personnel collected $3.02 billion in fiscal year 2014 revenue, a $222 
million or 7% drop from the $3.244 billion collected in fiscal year 2011.”). 
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had to increase their reliance upon tax return preparers and the tax return 
preparation software industry for guidance. When such guidance endures 
only minimal scrutiny, however, tax compliance and the delivery of gov-
ernment benefits are jeopardized. 
In light of the numerous shortcomings of the current tax preparation 
process, which harms many taxpayers and costs the government significant 
sums of lost tax revenue, Congress must intervene. There is no reason to 
believe that this is a circumstance where the market will correct itself. Tax 
return preparation is far too complex and the delay between filing and audit 
is too long for taxpayers to be able to effectively evaluate the quality of var-
ious return preparers or tax return preparation software companies. Moreo-
ver, congressional action would not be an instance of the government inap-
propriately intervening in the private sphere. Tax return preparers and tax 
return preparation software developers do not simply deliver a marketplace 
good to private individuals; they also serve as a direct intermediary between 
millions of taxpayers and the government each year and assist individuals in 
fulfilling an important legal obligation. Therefore, it is unquestionable that 
the government has a vital interest in regulating the tax return preparation 
process. Accordingly, section A of this Part explores proposals for regulat-
ing tax return preparers,177 and section B of this Part discusses proposals for 
regulating the tax return preparation software industry.178 
A. Expanding Tax Return Preparer Oversight 
In lieu of preparing their own tax returns, many taxpayers turn to tax 
return preparers to complete their tax returns.179 As discussed in Part I, tax 
return preparers generally fall within the scope of two broad categories. The 
first category is comprised of those who are specifically trained in the area 
of tax and include CPAs, lawyers, and enrolled agents who routinely pre-
pare tax returns. The second category is comprised of those individuals who 
have no special tax training and who often dabble in the area, commonly 
operating tax return preparation businesses seasonally out of their homes, 
basements, or storefronts.180 
Under the Loving v. IRS and Ridgely v. Lew decisions,181 the Treasury 
Department, for all intents and purposes, currently lacks the ability to regulate 
those who prepare tax returns, whether they are trained in the area of tax or 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See infra notes 179–217 and accompanying text. 
 178 See infra notes 218–255 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra note 4. 
 180 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 67 (Dec. 31, 2013) 
(“Without any regulation, we will continue to see a proliferation of return preparers showing up at 
check cashing places, pawnshops, used car dealerships, furniture stores, etc.”). 
 181 See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text. 
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not.182 This basically means that anyone can hold himself out as a tax expert 
(even if he lacks tax training), claim that he is beyond moral reproach (even if 
he has a criminal record), and start preparing taxpayers’ tax returns (even if he 
does so in a slipshod fashion) because the IRS lacks any viable means to 
sanction such tax preparers under Circular 230. This lack of congressional 
oversight is costly: millions of flawed tax returns are submitted,183 the na-
tion’s coffers hemorrhage,184 and low-income taxpayers often bear the brunt 
of this dystopian tax preparation world.185 
1. The Legislative Fix 
Tax return preparer competency is a problem for which there is a sim-
ple solution. Because a significant percentage of individual taxpayers’ tax 
returns are completed by tax return preparers, Congress would be wise to 
extend Circular 230’s application to the tax return preparation and submis-
sion process and, in particular, to all tax return preparers.186 To do so, Con-
gress could easily revise § 330 of Title 31 to include one sentence declaring 
that practice before the Treasury Department includes tax return preparation 
and another sentence declaring that, in the process of tax return preparation, 
tax return preparers187 act as taxpayers’ de facto representatives.188 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Compare Steve R. Johnson, How Far Does Circular 230 Exceed Treasury’s Statutory 
Authority?, 74 TAX PRAC. 55, 59 (Jan. 26, 2015) (assumes that Loving and Ridgely court decisions 
are either correct or, “even if incorrect, are likely to remain controlling”), with Camp, supra note 
45, at 457 (arguing that the Loving analysis is critically flawed). 
 183 See, e.g., IRS, IRS 2014 DATA BOOK 39 tbl.15 (2015) (indicating that for tax year 2013, 
for example, millions of tax returns contained mathematical errors). 
 184 See supra note 2 (explaining the federal tax gap). In response to the size of the nation’s tax 
gap, over the past decade, the National Taxpayer Advocate has strongly advocated that Congress 
regulate tax return preparers. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 180, at 63 (“Since 2002, 
the National Taxpayer Advocate has advocated for a system to regulate return preparers. Her pro-
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 185 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 38, at 445 (“With tens of billions in cash at stake—$63 billion 
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income communities to get a share of this money.”). 
 186 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 71 (Dec. 31, 2015) (“The 
National Taxpayer Advocate agrees that the only effective way to increase competency throughout 
the return preparer profession is for Congress to provide the IRS with the authority to implement a 
mandatory program substantially similar to the one already in place before Loving.”); New IRS Filing 
Season Program Unveiled for Tax Return Preparers: Voluntary Program to Focus on Continuing 
Education for Unenrolled Preparers, IRS (June 30, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/new-
irs-filing-season-program-unveiled-for-tax-return-preparers [https://perma.cc/KS5G-QP4V] (“The 
IRS continues to believe regulation of paid tax return preparers is important for the proper func-
tioning of the U.S. tax system.”). 
 187 Section 7701(a)(36) of the Code defines tax return preparer as “any person who prepares 
for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, any return of 
tax imposed by this title or any claim for refund of tax imposed by this title.” I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) 
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Adding these two sentences would enable the Treasury Department to 
require all tax return preparers to (i) pass competency examinations; (ii) 
undertake continuing tax education courses; and (iii) submit a separate, 
signed statement acknowledging their involvement in the process. Further-
more, the Treasury Department would be able to sanction those tax return 
preparers who failed to uphold certain moral decency standards.189 Tax pro-
fessionals like CPAs, attorneys, and enrolled agents who are already li-
censed and trained would be exempt from the additional regulatory re-
quirements. The combination of more competent tax practitioners at the 
helm of the tax return preparation process combined with newly devised tax 
preparation software (discussed below) would inevitably yield more accu-
rate tax returns, thereby narrowing the nation’s tax gap. 
2. Precedent for Return Preparer Regulation 
When it comes to regulating tax return preparers, the Treasury Depart-
ment would not have to begin from scratch. For starters, with the congres-
sional imprimatur, it could simply reinstate the 2011 regulations.190 Addition-
ally, the federal government can seize upon the experience of four states that 
have enacted tax return preparer regulatory regimes as successful models of 
regulation in this context. Specifically, California, Maryland, New York, and 
Oregon all regulate tax return preparers at the state level, albeit these states 
have taken somewhat different approaches.191 
The states’ approaches offer useful guidance about the most effective 
methods. By way of illustration, consider a study conducted by the GAO in 
                                                                                                                           
(2012). A new amendment to § 330(a)(1) of Title 31 might cross-reference this definition or, in 
the alternative, incorporate its own, similar definition. 
 188 See Levy, supra note 38, at 467–68 (“The legislative fix is easy, and can be as short as one 
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 189 There are several legislative initiatives designed to expand Circular 230’s ambit. See Tax-
payer Protection and Preparer Proficiency Act of 2015, S. 137, 114th Cong. (2015); Tax Return 
Preparer Accountability Act of 2014, H.R. 4470, 113th Cong. (2014). Little congressional support 
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 190 See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 191 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22253 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. 
§ 21-501 (West 2016); N.Y. TAX LAW § 32(b)(1) (McKinney 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 673.615 
(2015). 
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2008 comparing Oregon’s regulatory approach with California’s regime.192 
The Oregon regulatory regime requires eighty hours of tax education, 1100 
hours of work during two of the previous five years as a tax return preparer, 
thirty hours of annual continuing education, a high school diploma or 
equivalency exam, and competency testing.193 In contrast, the California 
regulatory regime requires sixty hours of tax education in the previous 
eighteen months and twenty hours of annual continuing education but no 
competency testing.194 Although the GAO’s report found that California’s 
regulatory regime did not appear to have a positive impact on tax compli-
ance, it found that returns filed by Oregon taxpayers were on average $250 
dollars more accurate (for a total of $390 million more in federal tax reve-
nue) compared to the rest of the country.195 Although many factors might 
affect the varying levels of compliance in these two states,196 one highly 
plausible explanation for the dissimilar compliance outcomes between the 
two states is that requiring written competency exams—part of Oregon’s 
regime197 but not California’s—is a crucial element of ensuring that tax re-
turn preparers are competent. Thus, any new federal regulatory regime 
should require that all covered tax return preparers submit to a written com-
petency examination. 
Additionally, the National Consumer Law Center, a consumer advoca-
cy group, has published the Model Individual Tax Preparer Regulation Act 
(“Model Act”), which includes further suggested protections based on its 
research findings.198 In addition to requiring sixty hours of tax training, fif-
teen hours of annual continuing education, and a written competency exam-
                                                                                                                           
 192 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-781, TAX PREPARERS: OREGON’S REGU-
LATORY REGIME MAY LEAD TO IMPROVED FEDERAL TAX RETURN ACCURACY AND PROVIDES A 
POSSIBLE MODEL FOR NATIONAL REGULATION 1 (2008). 
 193 See OR. REV. STAT. § 673.625. 
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tax preparer exams and only 30% for licensed tax consultant exams. Id. at 12. A licensed tax pre-
parer must work under the supervision of a licensed tax consultant, CPA, or attorney. Id. at 11. 
 198 See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MODEL INDIVIDUAL TAX PREPARER 
REGULATION ACT 1 (2013). 
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ination, the Model Act also requires that preparers provide consumers with 
a written disclosure of their training and education, along with written dis-
closure of (i) the fee for each service offered, (ii) all miscellaneous fees like 
filing and processing fees, and (iii) an estimate of the total charge for the 
preparer’s services.199 In light of the predatory practices that have been ob-
served in studies of unregulated tax return preparers with respect to their 
low-income clientele,200 the Treasury Department would be well advised to 
give special consideration to mandatory fee disclosures. Another consumer 
advocacy group has further suggested that tax return preparer regulations 
also explicitly ban predatory products like RALs, eliminate junk fees, and 
allow taxpayers to pay for tax preparation fees out of their refunds without 
incurring an additional charge.201 
3. Weighing the Potential Costs of Tax Return Preparer Regulation 
Although critics have voiced objections to federal tax return preparer 
regulations, the regulatory regimes in California, Maryland, New York, and 
Oregon offer models of success that should allay many, if not all, of those 
concerns. For example, the plaintiffs in Loving argued that fees for testing and 
continuing education could cost over $1000 per year and, as a result, would 
be unduly burdensome.202 Regarding the Oregon and California regulatory 
regimes, however, the GAO’s report indicates that costs are often significant-
ly lower than that estimate: “[T]he cost of obtaining continuing education was 
sometimes very low, especially when continuing education was obtained 
through participation in professional associations.”203 The report further noted 
that some preparers could obtain their continuing education at IRS forums 
costing $179, and others could obtain it “from state-approved education pro-
viders in both classroom settings and over the internet.”204 
The Loving plaintiffs also argued that the costs of regulation would 
force them to charge higher prices to their customers or go out of busi-
ness.205 The GAO’s research in California, however, found that 
The costs to obtain and maintain [registered preparer] status are 
fairly low and likely do not have much of an impact on prices 
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 200 See supra notes 123–128 and accompanying text. 
 201 See MICHAEL BEST, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., PROTECTING CONSUMERS AT TAX TIME: 
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consumers pay, and . . . the requirements to become a paid pre-
parer are not so great that the number of paid preparers in the 
state is being held lower than it would be without any regula-
tion.206 
Even if licensing and registration fees are passed on to consumers, it is un-
likely that the cost would be more than a few dollars per return.207 
Another cost to consider is that borne by the government in adminis-
tering a tax preparer regulatory regime. Presumably, prior to the issuance of 
the 2011 regulations, the Treasury Department and the IRS had already un-
dertaken a cost-benefit analysis and determined that a federal licensing re-
gime would be beneficial from the government’s perspective. Again, the 
experience of the states is informative and encouraging. The costs of admin-
istering competency testing are generally covered by the testing fees and do 
not require government funding.208 Additional administrative costs incurred 
by states, such as record keeping, maintaining a website, communicating 
with preparers, and instituting enforcement actions, are also paid for by the 
revenue generated by fees and penalties. For example, Oregon’s 2007 ad-
ministrative costs totaled $490,000, which were paid for by a combination 
of registration fees and fines for operating without a license and/or violating 
Oregon laws; none of the concomitant administrative costs associated with 
this program came from Oregon’s general revenue.209 The funding of the 
California program was similar, with no general revenue spent on adminis-
tering the tax return preparer regulatory regime.210 
Admittedly, implementing a regulatory regime for tax return preparers 
is not without costs, but existing evidence indicates that these costs pale in 
comparison with the associated benefits. Additional charges incurred by 
taxpayers in the form of higher fees are likely to be modest (if not nonexist-
ent), and fee disclosures might actually work to reduce certain types of fees 
charged by some preparers. The government’s enforcement cost would like-
ly be recouped through fees and fines, and narrowing the tax gap would 
result in significantly more revenue collected. Although some incompetent 
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sistent with this is the fact that paid preparer use in California is higher than the national average. 
Id. at 22. The same is not true for Oregon, which has lower paid preparer use than the national 
average. Id. The report notes that Oregon’s regime may restrict the number of preparers more than 
California’s regime because Oregon requires that licensed tax preparers only work in offices man-
aged by licensed tax consultants (the latter group possessing more qualifications), a restriction not 
present under the prior federal regime. See id. at 21–22. 
 207 See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 12. 
 208 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 18–19; WU & HERNANDEZ, 
supra note 10, at 12. 
 209 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 19. 
 210 Id. at 18. 
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tax preparers would likely be forced to exit the market, a minor reduction in 
the overall number of tax return preparers would be well worth the benefit 
of ensuring that the remaining preparers are trained, knowledgeable, and 
able to prepare accurate returns. 
4. Alternative Regulatory Approaches 
If Congress lacks the political appetite to enable the Treasury Depart-
ment to regulate tax return preparers in a direct fashion (i.e., expanding Cir-
cular 230’s ambit), it should supply more efficient tools to the agency to 
regulate tax return preparers in an indirect fashion. Numerous possibilities 
exist to deter dishonest return preparers, including (i) making it easier for 
the IRS to secure court injunctions against their ability to practice,211 (ii) 
enhancing their financial liability exposure,212 and (iii) strengthening crimi-
nal tax sanctions regarding their defalcations.213 The addition of such 
measures would hopefully give serious pause to those tax return preparers 
who were contemplating being unscrupulous. 
What Congress must bear in mind is that tax return preparers who are 
“bad apples” have a corrosive effect on the process, with the potential for 
spoiling part of or the entire barrel. In whatever way possible, Congress 
must give tools to the Treasury Department and the IRS to cull such tax re-
turn preparers from the system. 
5. Strengthening Taxpayer Involvement in the Return Preparation Process 
Once tax return preparers fulfill their mission and complete the prepa-
ration of taxpayers’ tax returns, taxpayers should not be entirely absolved 
from having further responsibility. Taxpayers may knowingly or unknow-
ingly contribute to errors on returns filled out by a preparer not only by fail-
ing to provide complete or accurate information but also by failing to re-
view the return once completed. 
                                                                                                                           
 211 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 611 F.3d 880, 882 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The District Court 
found that the defendants had engaged in deceptive practices in preparing tax returns and issued 
an injunction specifically prohibiting them from further engaging in any such conduct. It declined 
to completely bar them from operating as tax return preparers, as the Government requested, find-
ing such an extreme measure was unwarranted under the circumstances of the case.”). 
 212 See I.R.C. § 6694(b) (2012). The monetary fines associated with preparing flawed tax 
returns are fairly moderate. See id. (limiting the tax return preparer penalty to “the greater of (a) 
$5,000 or (b) 50% of the income derived (or to be derived) by the income tax return preparer with 
respect to the return or claim”). 
 213 Walter T. Henderson, Jr., Comment, Criminal Liability Under the Internal Revenue Code: 
A Proposal to Make the ‘Voluntary’ Compliance System a Little Less ‘Voluntary,’ 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1429, 1434 n.24 (1992) (citing empirical studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of crimi-
nal sanctions in curtailing criminal behavior). 
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To better understand taxpayers’ role in this context, consider the actual 
return submission process. First, the taxpayer supplies tax information re-
turns and other relevant tax information (for example, filing status and the 
number of household dependents) to the tax return preparer; second, the tax 
return preparer asks the taxpayer a series of tax-related questions (for ex-
ample, did you or someone in your family incur any medical expenses?); 
third, based upon the tax information returns and the taxpayer’s responses 
to the questions posed, the tax return preparer will produce completed tax 
returns; fourth, the taxpayer will review his tax return; and, fifth, assuming 
the tax return proves satisfactory, the taxpayer will authorize submission of 
the return by the tax return preparer. 
Notwithstanding this multistep nature of tax return preparation, the re-
ality is that many taxpayers who rely upon the services of paid tax return 
professionals may cumulatively spend fifteen minutes or less annually im-
mersed in the tax return submission process. How could such an intricate 
process take so little time to complete? The truth is that many taxpayers 
give the proverbial “shoe box” filled with tax information returns to their 
tax return preparers and then simply authorize the latter to submit the com-
pleted returns, sometimes even without reviewing them.214 In these kinds of 
situations, the bonds of fiscal citizenship are obviously quite tenuous. 
No doubt, when taxpayers retain tax return preparer services, they seek 
both expertise in tax and the administrative ease of delegating this responsi-
bility to someone else. Put differently, the vast majority of taxpayers who 
retain the services of tax professionals purposefully eschew the Code’s in-
tricacies and are willing to pay sizable fees to avoid the labor that tax return 
preparation requires.215 In these taxpayers’ minds, the less they have to do 
with the preparation of their tax returns, the better. Viewed through the lens 
of this prism, members of Congress cannot impose too many additional re-
sponsibilities upon those taxpayers who rely upon tax return preparers with-
out risking a fierce backlash, suggesting that they must proceed gingerly. 
It is possible, however, to require taxpayers to be more deeply engaged 
in the return preparation process than they are currently, and such involve-
ment should further promote tax compliance. Here is one tenable approach: 
before those taxpayers who utilize the services of a tax return preparer are 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See IRS, FORM 8879 (2015) (IRS e-file Signature Authorization) (taxpayers must simply 
sign and give this form to their tax return preparers, who may then handle the remainder of the 
return filing process on the taxpayer’s behalf). 
 215 See generally Laura Sanders, What Tax Return Preparers Are Really Charging for 2014 
Returns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2015, 2:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2015/01/16/what-
tax-preparers-are-really-charging-for-2014-returns/ [https://perma.cc/W8G7-J9MR] (“The nation-
al average fee for 2014 returns will be $273, according to a survey by the National Society of 
Accountants.”). 
192 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:151 
permitted to file their tax returns, they would be obligated to supply their 
tax return preparers with a signed, one-page declaration consisting of four 
parts, affirming (i) the importance of taxpayer honesty;216 (ii) the ad-
vantages associated with the submission of a correct return, namely, by do-
ing so, the government would have the financial resources to fulfill its role 
to provide public goods and services, such as maintaining national parks 
and sustaining the military; (iii) the disadvantages associated with the sub-
mission of an incorrect return, namely, the government would lack the fi-
nancial resources to fulfill its role to provide public goods and services and, 
if audited, the taxpayer may be liable for additional tax, penalties, and inter-
est; and (iv) gratitude expressed by the government for taxpayers fulfilling 
their civic duties. 
In order for a tax return to be considered properly filed, the taxpayer 
would have to initial all four parts of this one-page declaration and sign and 
date the bottom of it, and the tax return preparer would then have to submit 
it simultaneously with Form 1040. 
To bolster compliance, every year the government should change the 
content of this paperwork, its format, and possibly even its color scheme.217 
By constantly freshening up this declaration, the government would en-
hance the likelihood that the declaration would be carefully read and inter-
nalized. Failure to take this step would mean that after a year or two, tax-
payers would treat this process in a rote and mindless fashion, quickly ini-
tialing, signing, and dating the proposed declaration without reading it. As a 
result, tax compliance may correspondingly ebb. 
B. Expanding Tax Return Preparation Software Industry Oversight 
Although regulation of tax return preparers should go a long way to-
ward strengthening the integrity of the tax return preparation process, a sig-
nificant number of tax returns would not be covered—namely, those that are 
self-prepared.218 Congress should also empower the Treasury Department to 
regulate the tax return preparation software industry because most self-
                                                                                                                           
 216 The taxpayer could be asked to initial a statement verifying that she has reviewed the en-
tire return and that its contents are accurate. 
 217 Each year, taxpayers could possibly select a new tax “hero,” an imaginary figure or real 
person who is representative of our country’s ideals, who could advocate on the government’s 
behalf that taxpayers be honest and forthright in their reporting practices. 
 218 See Millions Prepare for Tax Deadline, IRS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/
newsroom/millions-prepare-for-tax-deadline-use-free-file-or-direct-pay-to-get-a-6-month-tax-filing-
extension-choose-direct-deposit-for-refunds [https://perma.cc/U8FN-D6LD] (approximately 41,725,000 
self-prepared by April 8, 2016). 
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prepared returns are completed using tax preparation software.219 Specifi-
cally, in the realm of tax return preparation software, Congress should allow 
the Treasury Department to regulate both the content and format of tax 
preparation software in order to improve compliance and protect low-
income taxpayers. 
1. The Legislative Fix 
As with regulating tax return preparers, Congress could easily author-
ize the Treasury Department to regulate the tax return preparation software 
industry with minor amendments to § 330(a) of Title 31. Specifically, Con-
gress could add a new subparagraph (a)(3) to § 330 that would cover tax 
return preparation software.220 When combined with amendments for regu-
lating tax return preparers, the new text of § 330(a) might read as follows 
(emphasis added for proposed new language): 
(a) [T]he Secretary of the Treasury may— 
 (1) regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the 
Department of the Treasury, including tax return preparation; 
 (2) before admitting a representative to practice, require that 
the representative demonstrate— 
  (A) good character; 
  (B) good reputation; 
  (C) necessary qualifications to enable the representative to 
provide to persons valuable service; and 
  (D) competency to advise and assist persons in presenting 
their cases; and 
 (3) regulate the content and format of any software or Internet 
program designed for use in the preparation of a federal tax re-
turn. 
For purposes of this section, “representative” includes any tax 
return preparer as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36). 
                                                                                                                           
 219 Over one-third of taxpayers use tax preparation software, which is the majority of the 
approximately 40% of taxpayers who self-prepare. See id.; see also Hearing, Protecting Taxpay-
ers, supra note 29, at 1 (34% of taxpayers use tax preparation software). 
 220 Although an alternative way to regulate software would be to simply include tax software 
developers in the definition of tax return preparer under § 7701(a)(36), this approach is likely too 
broad. Tax return preparers (as defined by § 7701) are subject to a number of provisions under the 
Code, such as criminal penalties for fraudulent tax return preparation, which will not necessarily 
be relevant for tax return preparation software developers. Thus, expanding § 330(a) of Title 31 to 
give the Treasury Department authority to regulate tax return preparation software is a preferable 
approach. 
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Amending § 330(a) of Title 31 in this fashion would give the Treasury 
Department leeway to develop a regulatory framework that focuses specifi-
cally on the issues presented by tax return preparation software. Although not 
an exhaustive list of possibilities, what follows is a discussion of potential 
avenues for such regulation, including mandatory screen content designed to 
improve compliance, removal of the prepayment-position status bar, and 
more transparent fee disclosure. From time to time, as technology evolves 
and commercial tax return preparation software companies continue to devel-
op their products, the Treasury Department might update and amend software 
regulation, informed by empirical studies on the effect of tax return prepara-
tion software on compliance and the uptake of government benefits. 
2. Mandatory Content 
As discussed in section B of Part II, certain features of tax return prep-
aration software encourage taxpayers to take more aggressive reporting po-
sitions than they might otherwise have taken on their own. Although there is 
certainly nothing nefarious about tax return preparation software helping 
taxpayers maximize their deductions and save taxes in a legitimate fashion, 
the lopsided approach of tax return preparation software (maximizing de-
ductions without maximizing income reporting) likely results in a revenue 
loss to the government. 
Accordingly, the Treasury Department should take steps to regulate the 
content of tax return preparation software to maximize income reporting and 
otherwise encourage honest, accurate filing by taxpayers. Computer screens 
with embedded salient information would ideally appear before taxpayers, 
requiring that users read them before they could progress to the next screen. 
Similar in nature to the recommended one-page declaration that must be 
signed by taxpayers who use the services of a tax return preparer, the prof-
fered information could stress the importance of integrity and highlight sali-
ent tax compliance themes, including that of carrots, sticks, and gratitude. 
a. Make Ethics Salient 
In terms of encouraging integrity in tax return preparation, there is 
compelling empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people tend 
to be more honest when they are reminded of their ethical obligations im-
mediately before they decide what to report.221 For example, subjects in 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dis-
honest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,197, 
15,197 (2012) (“Using laboratory and field experiments, we find that signing before—rather than 
after—the opportunity to cheat makes ethics salient when they are needed most and significantly 
reduces dishonesty.”). 
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studies who had to read and sign an honor code before taking a test cheated 
significantly less than subjects who were not presented with an honor 
code.222 Similarly, in a study of car insurance consumers who had to self-
report odometer mileage, significantly more miles were reported when con-
sumers had to sign the form at the top (before they filled it out) as compared 
to when they signed it at the bottom (after they filled it out).223 The same 
result was observed in a recent study of government contractors, who re-
ported more industrial funding fees when they had to e-sign an online form 
verifying the accuracy of the information reported before they reported it as 
opposed to after.224 
Extrapolating from the findings of these studies, the importance of in-
tegrity should be stressed at the inception of the process, not at the end. The 
Treasury Department therefore should require tax return preparation soft-
ware companies to inform their users at the commencement of the prepara-
tion process of their duty to report honestly. For example, when starting a 
new return, taxpayers might be presented with a screen that requires them to 
electronically sign a brief statement acknowledging that their return will be 
signed under “penalties of perjury” and/or to acknowledge a statement that 
reminds them of the paramount importance of being forthright.225 Given 
that taxpayers might prepare their return over a number of days by repeated-
ly saving their work and logging back in, these “honesty prompts” should 
be displayed each time taxpayers log in to continue work on their returns. If 
taxpayers are instead only told of the “penalties of perjury” standard at the 
end of the preparation process (as is currently the case), they will be more 
likely, based on the foregoing empirical evidence, to rationalize their ac-
tions, refusing to change their initial, less-than-candid responses.226 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept 
Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 636–37 (2008) (describing the outcome of their study). 
 223 See Shu et al., supra note 221, at 15,198 (consumers had a financial incentive to underre-
port their odometer miles because more miles driven causes higher insurance premiums). 
 224 See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SOCIAL AND BE-
HAVIORAL SCIENCES TEAM ANNUAL REPORT 15–16 (2015) (reporting that the industrial funding 
fee functions like a tax—it is a small percentage of the contractor’s sales that must be self-reported 
and paid to the government). 
 225 DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY 47–48 (2012). This approach 
has drawn some media attention. See, e.g., An Easy Way to Induce Honesty: Make People Sign at 
the Top of a Form Instead of the Bottom, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/15/an-easy-trick-to-mitigate-tax-form-
cheating/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160511202237/http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworking
knowledge/2013/04/15/an-easy-trick-to-mitigate-tax-form-cheating/#29e8e57746c9]). For more 
suggestions regarding potential language to make ethics salient on tax returns, see Kathleen 
DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L. REV. 617, 648–49 (2015). 
 226 See Shu et al., supra note 221, at 15,197. 
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b. Require Affirmative Responses 
In order to induce more honest reporting, the Treasury Department 
should also mandate that tax return preparation software companies require 
taxpayers to affirmatively indicate whether or not they have particular types 
of income or owe certain taxes. 
A preliminary question is why some taxpayers lie on their tax returns 
in the first place. One obvious answer is wealth enhancement. Although 
robbing a bank would also enhance taxpayers’ wealth, most do not resort to 
utilizing this option. This is because robbing a bank would require an in-
vestment of a lot of time, effort, and energy to commit the crime and would 
engender a big downside risk, namely, significant jail time. These factors 
cast a large dark shadow on the allure of this sort of wealth enhancement 
strategy. The same cannot be said about stealing from the U.S. Treasury: 
this crime does not require a detailed plan, a getaway car, and a place to 
wash the stolen funds; all a taxpayer has to do is strategically omit certain 
information from the tax return (for example, cash receipts for services ren-
dered), and, in most instances, wealth enhancement likely will be 
achieved.227 As various psychological studies confirm, an act of omission 
(like failing to report income) costs individuals very little mental energy 
compared to an act of commission (like robbing a bank).228 Given the bur-
geoning tax gap,229 these psychological studies should be a lodestar in craft-
ing software changes. 
Under the current system, taxpayers using tax return preparation soft-
ware may intentionally or unintentionally omit certain items when there are 
no specific prompts, or they may ignore less aggressive software prompts 
even when they are present. These tendencies could be mitigated by requiring 
tax return preparation software companies to include mandatory prompts that 
require a taxpayer to enter an amount of a particular type of income (“zero” 
if they did not have any such income) or to check a “yes” or “no” box indi-
cating whether they had such income for the taxable year. The reformula-
tion of tax return questions would not have to be universal. The mandatory 
prompts might be focused on a few areas that are particularly problematic 
                                                                                                                           
 227 Under standard deterrence theory, taxpayers weigh the economic benefit of cheating on 
their taxes versus the potential downside economic cost of enduring penalties multiplied by the 
risk of being detected. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoreti-
cal Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324–25 (1972). 
 228 See Joseph Bankman et al., Using the “Smart Return” to Reduce Tax Evasion 6 (Stanford 
Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2578432, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2578432 [https://perma.cc/LSE5-QLKZ] (citing two studies in support of this proposition: (i) 
Vincent van Veen et al., Neural Activity Predicts Attitude Change in Cognitive Dissonance, 12 NA-
TURE NEUROSCI. 1469, 1472–73 (2009); and (ii) SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL 
COGNITION (2d ed. 1991)). 
 229 See supra note 3. 
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from a tax compliance perspective, such as nonreporting of cash income, 
lack of substantiation for ordinary and necessary deductions, suspect chari-
table deductions, or failure to report household employees.230 Forcing tax-
payers to affirmatively lie on their return if they want to omit tax obliga-
tions should make them more reluctant to do so and thereby increase com-
pliance.231 
Consider the following example. Tax returns currently ask taxpayers 
how much income they earn annually. Suppose a taxpayer who is a salaried 
teacher at a public school moonlights as a math tutor, earning $10,000 an-
nually in cash. On her income tax return, this taxpayer might selectively 
“forget” to include this dollar amount in her gross income. Suppose, how-
ever, that the soliciting tax return question were reformulated, asking in-
stead, “Aside from your salaried income, did you earn or receive any addi-
tional income?” The software could then require the taxpayer to respond 
“yes” or “no” before proceeding. Under this question reformulation, if the 
taxpayer sought to avoid reporting her tutoring income, she would now 
have to perpetrate an outright lie—a feat that psychological studies indicate 
is much harder to do than simply omitting information.232 
This suggestion for modifying tax return preparation software prompts 
is not without precedent. Years ago, when tax return preparation software 
asked taxpayers if they had foreign bank accounts, the programs would au-
tomatically fill in a default “no,” which the taxpayer was at liberty to 
change to “yes.” The IRS apparently requested the tax return preparation 
software industry to change this, so the software no longer automatically 
defaults to “no”; that being the case, taxpayers now proactively have to 
choose a response.233 
Another approach to help bolster taxpayer compliance could be to re-
quire software companies to utilize question algorithms designed for each 
individual taxpayer.234 In the sphere of consumerism, the use of question 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 423–527 
(2014) (explaining, in the section of the report entitled “Most Litigated Issues,” those issues in 
which the IRS commonly challenges taxpayers’ reporting positions); see also Thomas, supra note 
225, at 649. 
 231 See Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371, 384 (2007); 
Thomas, supra note 225, at 649–50; Bankman et al., supra note 228, at 6. 
 232 See Bankman et al., supra note 228, at 6. 
 233 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 11. In this same report, the GAO 
stated thus: “IRS’s Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) office worked with a group of tax software 
developers to ensure software used by paid preparers eliminated default answers where taxpayers’ 
answers are critical to return EITC accuracy, and incorporated a ‘note’ capability in the tax soft-
ware enabling the preparer to record additional inquiries and taxpayer responses.” Id. at 12. 
 234 See Bankman et al., supra note 228, at 18 (“A key advantage to this approach is that by 
eliminating irrelevant questions, the taxpayer will feel that the questions that are being asked are 
more important: that importance should make it harder for the taxpayer to lie.”). 
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algorithms is standard fare.235 For example, when consumers shop online, 
based upon their responses to certain questions, they journey along different 
query paths that are presumably specific to their unique situations. As the 
questions are more directed to respondents’ particular circumstances and 
tastes, consumers can convey relevant information more accurately. In the 
jargon of these studies, the consumer becomes intertwined with the process 
and thus more “invested” and, as such, more apt to participate in a meaning-
ful fashion.236 
These kinds of solicitation algorithms may be a viable platform that 
the Treasury Department should prod the tax return preparation software 
industry to employ in order to entice taxpayers to be more candid. Specifi-
cally designed questions could lead taxpayers down different (and individu-
ally suitable) decision paths.237 By offering taxpayers more meaningful 
online experiences, ones that appear geared to their particular circumstanc-
es, taxpayers would hopefully be candid in accurately reporting their in-
come and allowable deductions. 
c. Reduce Unintentional Errors 
The Treasury Department could also identify specific areas of low 
compliance where reporting errors are likely caused by confusion and re-
quire software companies to provide taxpayers with additional clarification 
and guidance. Consider, for example, a 2008 GAO report describing the 
high misreporting rate among taxpayers holding rental real estate property, 
particularly with respect to deductions related to the property.238 The report 
concludes that one likely reason for high rates of noncompliance is the 
complexity associated with reporting rental real estate activities, pointing 
out that many taxpayers simply may not understand their reporting obliga-
tions.239 Among the report’s recommendations for improving compliance in 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See, e.g., Janice Denegri-Knott & Mike Molesworth, Redistributed Consumer Desire in 
Digital Virtual Worlds of Consumption, 29 J. MARKETING MGMT. 1561, 1561 (Oct. 2013) (ex-
plaining how computer software may shape consumer desire); Alexander Felfernig et al., 
Knowledge-Based Recommender Technologies for Marketing and Sales, 21 INT’L J. PATTERN 
RECOGNITION & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 333, 333 (2007). 
 236 See, e.g., Lingyum Qiu & Izak Benbasat, Evaluating Anthropomorphic Product Recom-
mendation Agents: A Social Relationship Perspective to Designing Information Systems, 25 J. 
MGMT. INFO. SYS. 145, 145 (2009) (describing how computer software, in an attempt to build a 
social relationship with a consumer visiting a website, tries to replicate the experience a customer 
may have with a salesperson in a store). 
 237 See Bankman et al., supra note 228, at 18. 
 238 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-956, TAX GAP: ACTIONS THAT 
COULD IMPROVE RENTAL REAL ESTATE REPORTING COMPLIANCE 9 (2008) (“At least an estimat-
ed 53 percent of individual taxpayers with rental real estate misreported their rental real estate 
activities for tax year 2001.”). 
 239 Id. at 18–19. 
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the context of rental real estate is the suggestion that the IRS work with tax 
return preparation software companies to improve guidance to taxpayers by 
including additional information about reporting rental real estate in their 
programs.240 Going forward, the Treasury Department and the IRS could 
identify additional areas where clarification and amplification of the tax re-
turn submission requirements associated with specific tax return items 
could further bolster compliance. Additionally, subject to further empirical 
study, separate screens or embedded explanations might be included in 
software programs to improve uptake in government benefits like the EITC. 
d. Carrots, Sticks, and Gratitude 
Beyond stressing integrity, tax return preparation software should in-
clude important tax compliance themes: “carrots,” “sticks,” and gratitude. 
Insofar as so-called carrots are concerned, one computer screen could 
inform taxpayers of the virtues of successfully completing and submitting 
an accurate tax return. Among the many things that this screen would indi-
cate is how tax revenue is put to public use to sustain, for example, the na-
tion’s military apparatus, judicial system, and public parks.241 The computer 
screen could also indicate that mathematical accuracy and factual correct-
ness essentially ensure the taxpayer of closure, precluding a subsequent IRS 
adjustment. 
Another computer screen that might immediately follow the “carrot” 
screen would be a “stick” screen, consisting of a series of warnings. In this 
screen’s narrative, the Treasury Department could caution taxpayers that 
inaccurate tax return submissions could be costly and result in the imposi-
tion of additional tax, interest, and penalties. Moreover, items of particular 
concern (for example, the nondisclosure of foreign bank investments) could 
be highlighted in red.242 Finally, the computer screen could point out that 
                                                                                                                           
 240 Id. at 27, 30. The report also notes that guidance incorporated into software would also 
likely help paid preparers (who use software). See id. at 30. 
 241 See Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Gov-
ernment Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 179–80 (2013) (ar-
guing that compliance is better when people like how their tax dollars are spent); see also Cutting 
Government Spending May Be Popular but There Is Little Appetite for Cutting Specific Govern-
ment Programs, HARRIS POLL (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.theharrispoll.com/
politics/Cutting_Government_Spending_May_Be_Popular_But_There_Is_Little_Appetite_For_
Cutting_Specific_Government_Programs.html [https://perma.cc/65ZF-U6ZV] (reflecting study 
that taxpayers do not want cuts to popular programs such as Social Security and federal aid to 
education). 
 242 The IRS estimates that, over the last decade, the government has lost billions of dollars of 
revenue from taxpayers’ failure to disclosed income earned overseas. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PER-
MANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: THE EFFORT 
TO COLLECT UNPAID TAXES ON BILLIONS IN HIDDEN OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS 3–4 (Comm. Print, 
Feb. 23, 2014) (estimating that taxpayers have hidden great amounts of wealth in overseas ac-
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the IRS has a number of tools at its disposal to cross-check tax return accu-
racy (for example, tax information returns) and to monitor compliance (for 
example, its staff of field auditors). The bottom of the computer screen 
could emphasize that if a taxpayer’s derelictions are fraudulent, such defal-
cations might ultimately result in the imposition of criminal sanctions.243 
A final computer screen that the Treasury Department could require is 
one reflective of the nation’s deep gratitude toward those taxpayers who 
faithfully fulfill their civic duty of preparing and submitting their tax returns 
and paying their taxes. For many taxpayers, submitting an accurate tax re-
turn is a painstaking ordeal; the government should recognize and applaud 
this effort, which would have the dual effect of expressing thanks and moti-
vating taxpayers (via positive reinforcement) to fulfill their civic duty the 
following year. 
3. Removing the Prepayment-Position Status Bar 
Along with improving the content of software programs, the Treasury 
Department could reduce aggressive reporting by simply mandating that 
software programs remove the prepayment-position status bar from the top 
of the screen during the tax preparation process. Recall that the prepayment-
position status bar displays the potential balance owed or refund due to the 
taxpayer at each stage of the tax preparation process.244 In light of the em-
pirical evidence that taxpayers report more honestly when the status bar is 
absent,245 regulations could require that taxpayers not be informed of their 
refund or balance due until they complete the tax preparation process (and 
have reviewed the compliance-enhancing content described above). Alt-
hough both tax return preparation software companies and taxpayers might 
shun such a requirement, it should be noted that this change simply puts 
taxpayers in the same position they would be in if they prepared their taxes 
without software or if they used a tax return preparer. In both of these cir-
cumstances, taxpayers are apprised of their refund or balance due at the end 
of the tax return preparation process. Although in either case taxpayers 
might go back to their return to make more favorable adjustments, they 
probably would be less inclined to do so, or unable to figure out how to do 
                                                                                                                           
counts, greatly contributing to the size of the tax gap). With a host of new compliance measures 
that Congress has instituted to bolster the IRS’s oversight arsenal (for example, Foreign Account 
Compliance Tax Act, Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 
§ 501(a), 124 Stat. 71 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)), Congress aspires 
to stem this revenue leakage. See id. 
 243 See I.R.C. §§ 7201–7241 (2012) (crimes). 
 244 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
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so, as compared to when they can see their refund or balance due fluctuate 
with each line item on the return. 
4. Free Filing and Fee Disclosures 
In addition to improving tax compliance and enhancing revenue col-
lection, regulation of tax return preparation software could also aid low-
income taxpayers and improve the delivery of government benefits. 
First, the Treasury Department might consider intervening to improve 
access to free filing because currently only a small portion of taxpayers eli-
gible to use the IRS’s Free File site do so.246 Such regulation might require 
software companies to notify taxpayers of the Free File site when they visit 
the company website by providing a link to the site and clear, noticeable 
language about free filing. Although some taxpayers are able to file for free 
directly through private software company websites,247 others may be un-
wittingly lured to what they think is a free site and then forced to upgrade to 
a fee-based version of the software after they have already begun work on 
their return.248 
Treasury could also mandate better up-front fee disclosures for all tax 
return preparation programs. For example, when a taxpayer visits a software 
company’s website and clicks a link for putative “free” filing, she could be 
presented with a brief checklist to determine how complicated her return 
will be so that she can be notified in advance of the cost, if any. The check-
list might ask questions about how much income is reported on her Form 
W-2, whether she operates her own business, whether she has received cer-
tain tax forms (for example, Form 1099-B), and whether she has a health 
savings account.249 Some taxpayers with simple tax situations would be 
able to file for free, and those who would be required to use a more expen-
sive version of the software program could be informed of the cost before 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 247 See, e.g., TurboTax Federal Free Edition, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-
taxes/online/free-edition.jsp [https://perma.cc/E8B4-3TNS] (advertising the availability of free 
filing). 
 248 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 249 See Sharf, supra note 88 (explaining that TurboTax’s Federal Free Edition forced her to 
upgrade to the Deluxe Edition for $34.99 because she had a health savings account). Sharf also 
notes that although TurboTax’s Federal Free Edition is not part of the Free File Alliance, Turbo-
Tax’s Freedom Edition is, and the latter supports more tax forms. The Freedom Edition is not, 
however, displayed on the front page of TurboTax’s website, although the Federal Free Edition is. 
Id. If a taxpayer unwittingly begins work using the Federal Free Edition and then later discovers 
the Freedom Edition (i.e., the version on the IRS’s Free File website), the company will not allow 
for an automatic transfer of the taxpayer’s information from one version to the other; instead, the 
taxpayer would have to start the return preparation process over. Id. 
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they proceed. Taxpayers should also be notified up front about the cost of 
each state tax return. 
The reason for these suggestions is simple: knowledge is comforting. 
If taxpayers are aware of whether they truly qualify for free filing or, if not, 
have an accurate assessment of their anticipated preparation and submission 
fees, they will no doubt harbor a lot less anguish about and frustration to-
ward the tax return filing process, boding well for compliance. 
5. Collaboration with the Tax Return Preparation Software Industry 
In many settings, the government has sought input from private indus-
tries that it regulates,250 and this context would not have to be different: the 
Treasury Department could similarly seek input from private software com-
panies regarding regulation. Although there is an inherent tension between 
the interests of the tax return preparation software industry and the govern-
ment, the two have collaborated in a productive manner in a number of pri-
or settings. For example, as discussed above in section B of Part I, the tax 
return preparation software industry and the IRS have recently announced a 
partnership to work together to combat online identity theft.251 Identity 
fraud negatively impacts both the government and the software industry, as 
well as the taxpaying public, and finding ways to reduce it should benefit all 
parties. The software industry has voluntarily collaborated with the gov-
ernment in other settings as well,252 such as agreeing to help the Treasury 
Department conduct research on what kinds of software interventions might 
help improve compliance with respect to EITC claims.253 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See, e.g., Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Stand-
ards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357, 19,358 (Mar. 30, 2012) (“Feder-
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and shall . . . participate with such bodies in the development of technical standards.”); Steven Over-
ly, Government Seeks Input on Managing the Internet, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/06/AR2010080605883.html [https://perma.cc/
9SGN-65HC] (“The Commerce Department is seeking input from the private sector on govern-
ment policy for managing the Internet, as it seeks to update its approach for the first time in a 
decade.”). All federal regulations first must be published in the Federal Register in proposed 
form, after which they must undergo a notice and comment period during which any interested 
member of the public may submit comments. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO 
THE RULE MAKING PROCESS, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_
rulemaking_process.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
 251 See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 252 See supra note 233 and accompanying text (stating that the IRS works with tax preparation 
software companies to ensure that the companies include updates to the tax laws in their software). 
 253 See David Williams, Intuit Chief Tax Officer Says Reducing EITC Errors Shouldn’t Come on 
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Given the preexisting relationship between the tax return preparation 
software industry and the government, the various types of regulation pro-
posed here would not necessarily have to stem from a combative process. In 
fact, in many cases, working symbiotically would be advantageous to both 
sides (although the government must have the final say regarding how to 
regulate the tax return preparation process). The government might benefit 
from the technical expertise provided by the software industry, while the 
industry itself would benefit by coexisting alongside the IRS rather than 
being ultimately supplanted by universally available government-provided 
tax software. Further, in light of the highly publicized turmoil between the 
government and the tax return preparation software industry surrounding 
government-prepared tax returns,254 the software industry might even wel-
come regulation that tacitly acknowledges its continuing role in the tax re-
turn preparation process. 
The whole exercise of regulating the tax return preparation software 
industry raises a more fundamental question: because tax return preparation 
is a major point of traction between taxpayers and their fiscal citizenship, 
shouldn’t the government be the sole intermediary of this important public 
function? In other words, looming large in the background of the preceding 
discussion of tax return preparation software regulation is the highly salient 
question of whether the government’s goals would be best achieved by 
simply taking over the tax preparation process. 
Nevertheless, for the time being, Congress appears willing to delegate 
a hefty segment of the tax revenue collection process to tax return preparers 
and the tax return preparation software industry. Notwithstanding the merits 
of arguments for government-prepared tax returns,255 this Article’s pro-
posals acknowledge the reality that tax return preparers and tax return prep-
aration software do not appear to be going away anytime soon. This delega-
tion of responsibility by Congress, however, should be accompanied by an 
immense amount of circumspection in order to protect taxpayers and the 
government’s revenue interest. 
                                                                                                                           
backs-of-low-income-taxpayers/#5471ef012761] (“This tax season, Intuit has partnered with Treas-
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 254 See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text. 
 255 See generally Joseph Bankman, Stanford Law Professor Testifies Before Tax Reform Pan-
el, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 16, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 95-50 (suggesting that the IRS should 
institute a “ReadyReturn” similar to that of California); Goolsbee, supra note 96 (proposing that 
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CONCLUSION 
Tax return preparers and the tax return preparation software industry 
have one agenda—namely, the generation of more professional fees and 
product sales; Congress and the IRS have another agenda—namely, revenue 
collection and accurate distribution of government benefits. As evidenced 
by the fact that the majority of taxpayers are tax compliant, these two agen-
das overlap in large part. Given the tax gap’s size, however, the two agendas 
clearly are not coterminous. 
One possible way to address the tax gap and to try to close it would be 
to improve upon the tax return submission process. Since the inception of 
the income tax, the IRS has played two major roles in the tax return prepa-
ration and completion process. The first role has consisted of disseminating 
tax returns and related instructions to the general populace, and the second 
role has consisted of assembling and processing the completed tax returns. 
Yet, tax return preparers and technological advancements in the form of tax 
preparation software essentially have eliminated the IRS’s first role in the 
process, resulting in taxpayers placing their tax fate in the hands of third-
party intermediaries. 
To enhance tax compliance, Congress should regulate these third-party 
intermediaries. Congressional oversight is not without precedent: since the 
1880s, Congress has successfully regulated practitioners who represented 
taxpayers before the Treasury Department. Furthermore, in other realms in 
which private industry performs important public functions (for example, 
telephone companies and their surveillance of telephone records), Congress 
plays an important regulatory oversight role. 
There are many forms that regulatory oversight can take. This Article 
offers several, albeit not exhaustive, reform suggestions. Adoption of one or 
more of them would strengthen the bonds of fiscal citizenship and simulta-
neously help narrow the tax gap. If, however, Congress ignores its responsi-
bilities, taxpayers’ bonds of fiscal citizenship may become even more tat-
tered and frayed—a plight that might further erode the tax base, causing the 
tax gap to grow even larger. 
